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ABSTRACT 
This study examines liquidity and cost of capital effects around voluntary and mandatory 
IAS/IFRS adoptions. In contrast to prior work, we focus on the firm-level heterogeneity in the 
economic consequences, recognizing that firms have considerable discretion in how they 
implement the new standards. Some firms may make very few changes and adopt IAS/IFRS more 
in name, while for others the change in standards could be part of a strategy to increase their 
commitment to transparency. To test these predictions, we classify firms into ‘label’ and ‘serious’ 
adopters using firm-level changes in reporting incentives, actual reporting behavior, and the 
external reporting environment around the switch to IAS/IFRS. We analyze whether capital-
market effects are different across ‘serious’ and ‘label’ firms. While on average liquidity and 
costs of capital often do not change around voluntary IAS/IFRS adoptions, we find considerable 
heterogeneity: ‘Serious’ adoptions are associated with an increase in liquidity and a decline in 
cost of capital, whereas ‘label’ adoptions are not. We obtain similar results when classifying firms 
around mandatory IFRS adoption. Our findings imply that we have to exercise caution when 
interpreting capital-market effects around IAS/IFRS adoption as they also reflect changes in 
reporting incentives or broader changes in firms’ reporting strategies, and not just the standards. 
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Key Words: International accounting, Reporting incentives, IAS, U.S. GAAP, Disclosure, Cost 
of equity, IFRS implementation 
* Accepted by Douglas Skinner. We appreciate the helpful comments of an anonymous referee, Ray Ball, Hans 
Christensen, Joachim Gassen, Günther Gebhardt, Bob Holthausen, Bjorn Jorgensen, Peter Wysocki, Steve Young, 
and workshop participants at the 2007 Utah Winter Accounting Conference, 2007 Harvard Business School IMO 
Conference, 2007 Global Issues in Accounting Conference, 2007 Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 
Conference, 2008 AAA Annual Meeting, University of Chicago, INSEAD, Lancaster University, University of 
Lugano, University of Mannheim, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Missouri, and New York 
University. We thank Eric Blouin, Emily Goergen, Wannia Hu, Yuji Maruyama, Anindya Mishra, Michael Sall, 
Caleb Smith, Richie Wan, and Kai Wright for their excellent research assistance. The dataset of voluntary IAS 
reporting is available for download here: http://research.chicagobooth.edu/arc/journal/onlineappendices.aspx. 
 1 
1. Introduction 
Over the last number of years the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) or, before that, International Accounting Standards (IAS) has gained considerable 
momentum around the world.1 Over 100 countries require or permit the use of IFRS for financial 
reporting purposes, and several more are considering a mandate or at least to give firms an option 
to report under IFRS (www.iasplus.com). Even before the IFRS mandate, many firms have 
voluntarily adopted IAS. An important issue for the literature analyzing capital-market outcomes 
around IAS and IFRS adoptions is whether the observed consequences can be attributed to the 
change in standards itself, and hence can be labeled IAS or IFRS effects. 
To highlight the difficulties in isolating such effects, we examine cross-sectional differences 
in capital-market outcomes around IAS/IFRS adoptions and the role of firm-level reporting 
incentives in explaining them. We show that a simple partitioning based on changes in firm-level 
reporting incentives around IAS/IFRS adoptions has significant explanatory power for the 
direction and magnitude of the observed capital-market outcomes. The evidence is consistent with 
pervasive selection effects, particularly for voluntary adoptions, and cautions us to interpret 
observed capital-market outcomes as a response to the change in standards alone. The evidence 
also questions the extent to which a switch to IAS/IFRS by itself (without any other changes) 
represents a commitment to a certain level of transparency. 
For the most part, our analyses center on voluntary IAS adoptions. We do so for three reasons. 
First, our research design relies crucially on having sufficient variation in the underlying motives 
for IAS adoption to illustrate the selection issue. In this regard, studying voluntary adopters helps 
                                                 
1  See, e.g., Barth [2008] and Hail, Leuz, and Wysocki [2010]. In 2001, IAS were renamed to IFRS. In this paper, 
we use the two terms interchangeably, but primarily refer to IAS as our sample period goes back as far as 1990. 
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to increase the power of the tests. Yet, as we demonstrate later in the paper, reporting incentives 
also play a role around mandatory IFRS adoption, for instance, in determining whether firms 
resist changing their reporting practices. Second, voluntary IAS adoptions are not as clustered in 
time as mandatory adoptions but rather spread over multiple periods (from 1990 to 2005 in our 
sample). This feature makes it easier to eliminate the effects of unrelated economic shocks and 
institutional changes. Third, understanding the effects around voluntary adoptions is useful even 
in times when IFRS reporting is mandatory in many countries. For instance, firms that adopted 
IAS/IFRS voluntarily can serve as an important benchmark in studies that seek to identify the 
effects of mandatory IFRS reporting (e.g., Christensen, Hail, and Leuz [2012]). Furthermore, 
voluntary adoption is relevant to private firms that in most jurisdictions are not subject to the 
IFRS mandate and to firms with the option to adopt IFRS in countries not yet imposing a 
mandate. 
Our main hypothesis is that the observed economic consequences around IAS adoptions 
depend on management’s reporting incentives, including the underlying motivations for the 
accounting change, rather than the change in accounting standards per se. As a result we expect 
predictable heterogeneity in outcomes across firms. In particular, one frequently voiced concern is 
that some firms adopt IAS merely in name without making material changes to their reporting 
policies (e.g., Ball [2001], [2006]). We refer to these firms as ‘label adopters’. Firms may also 
adopt IAS as part of a broader strategy to increase their commitment to transparency. We refer to 
these firms as ‘serious adopters’ meaning that they are ‘serious’ about the change in their 
reporting strategy (which includes but is not necessarily limited to IAS adoption). Our study is 
designed to identify and examine such differences across firms. Provided that investors can 
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differentiate between ‘serious’ and ‘label’ firms, we should observe differential capital-market 
effects, e.g., in market liquidity and cost of capital. 
To conduct our analysis, we construct a large panel of voluntary IAS adoptions from 1990 to 
2005 across 30 countries. We identify voluntary IAS adoptions based on accounting standards 
data in Worldscope, Global Vantage, and an extensive hand-collection of more than 20,000 
annual reports. We create an IAS reporting panel, which allows us to provide descriptive evidence 
on the adoption trends around the world as well as on firms’ individual adoption strategies (see 
the Appendix). As expected, the number of firms reporting under IAS steadily increases over the 
years. In addition, there is substantial variation in the frequency of voluntary IAS adoptions 
across countries. 
We begin our tests by analyzing whether voluntary IAS reporting, on average, is associated 
with higher market liquidity and a lower cost of capital relative to local GAAP firms, and relative 
to firms’ own pre-IAS histories. We examine three measures of economic outcomes, namely the 
price impact of trades (Amihud [2002]), the percentage bid-ask spread, and the implied cost of 
capital. Using these variables (and several others in the sensitivity analyses), we find little 
evidence that voluntary IAS (or U.S. GAAP) reporting has beneficial capital-market effects. To 
benchmark the findings, we show that proxies indicating stronger firm-level reporting incentives 
(measured in levels) as well as U.S. cross-listings, which have been shown to represent a credible 
commitment to more transparency (e.g., Hail and Leuz [2009]), are associated with higher market 
liquidity and a lower cost of capital. Both benchmark findings make it unlikely that measurement 
error in the dependent variables or lack of power are responsible for the weak average effects 
around voluntary IAS adoptions. 
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Next, we analyze firm-level heterogeneity in the capital-market effects around voluntary IAS 
adoptions. The idea behind these tests is to illustrate that markets respond positively to changes in 
firms’ economics that lead to improvements in management’s reporting incentives around IAS 
adoptions, but not to all IAS adoptions. This, in turn, calls into question whether the capital 
market effects are attributable to IAS reporting per se. We use three proxies to identify major 
changes in firm-level reporting incentives around IAS adoptions. Our first proxy is input-based 
and focuses directly on firm characteristics that shape management’s reporting incentives. 
Specifically, we expect managers in firms that are larger, more profitable, more international, 
have larger financing needs, larger growth opportunities, and more dispersed ownership structures 
to have stronger incentives for transparent financial reporting. We use factor analysis to 
summarize the incentive effects from these firm attributes and extract a single factor (with 
consistent loadings). Our second proxy is output-based and focuses on firms’ reporting behavior. 
It is built on the idea that actual reporting changes are ultimately driven by changes in the 
underlying incentives. Following Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki [2003], we use the magnitude of 
accruals relative to the cash flow from operations as a simple characterization of reporting 
behavior and earnings informativeness. Accrual-based proxies for earnings quality have been 
contentious in the literature (e.g., Dechow, Ge, and Schrand [2010]). They could also be 
spuriously affected in our stetting due to the switch in accounting standards. Thus, we use a third 
proxy that does not rely on accounting information. Namely, we capture changes in the external 
reporting environment using the number of analysts following a firm. The idea is that scrutiny by 
analysts and markets also shapes management’s reporting incentives. For each of the three 
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proxies, we compute the changes around IAS adoptions, and use the distribution of the changes to 
split the sample into ‘serious’ and ‘label’ firms.2 
The cross-sectional analyses provide the following results: first, we show that firms exhibit 
substantial (positive and negative) variation in the three proxies for changes in reporting 
incentives around IAS adoptions. Second, we show that ‘serious’ adopters (i.e., firms with above 
median changes in reporting incentives) experience an increase in market liquidity and a decline 
in the costs of capital relative to ‘label’ adopters. The results are statistically and economically 
significant and similar across partitioning variables. Compared to local GAAP firms, the net 
effect on market liquidity is also positive and economically significant, consistent with the notion 
that serious adopters increase their commitment to transparency. The net effect on cost of capital 
is less robust and generally close to zero, except when we split by the reporting incentives factor, 
in which case we find a significant decrease in the cost of capital. Similarly, we find evidence that 
the net effect on Tobin’s q is significantly positive, as predicted, for serious adopters when using 
the change in the reporting incentives factor. 
Finally, we show that the three partitions also explain firm-level heterogeneity in the effects 
around mandatory IFRS adoptions. Thus, the reporting incentive results carry over to mandatory 
accounting changes. These tests address an important concern: given that our sample spreads over 
many years during which IAS/IFRS have evolved substantially, the results could reflect 
heterogeneity in what constitutes an IAS adoption or in the standards themselves, rather than 
                                                 
2  The construction of our split variables and the focus on changes allows for the possibility that firms with strong 
reporting incentives already provide high-quality reports under local GAAP. Thus, ‘label’ adopters are not 
necessarily firms with poor reporting, but firms without a substantial increase in reporting incentives around 
IAS adoption, and hence one would not expect to observe positive market effects. For this reason, we control 
for the level of reporting incentives in the model. Conversely, the ‘label’ group can comprise firms with a 
substantial reduction in reporting incentives around IAS adoption, thereby leading to negative market outcomes. 
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heterogeneity in the change in reporting incentives at the time of IAS adoption. Illustrating that 
the three partitions produce similar results around mandatory IFRS eases this concern and makes 
it unlikely that heterogeneity in the IAS coding or in the standards is the primary driver of our 
results because at the time of the mandate heterogeneity in the standards should be minimal.3 
Instead, it points to reporting incentives as the key source of the heterogeneity in outcomes. We 
also show that serious and label adoptions occur in all time periods and many countries, and that 
our main results hold in the early and late part of the sample period. 
The paper’s two main contributions to the literature are as follows. First, our study is among 
the first to highlight and test firm-level heterogeneity in the capital-market effects around 
voluntary and mandatory IAS/IFRS adoptions. Existing studies tend to focus on the average 
effect of these adoptions with respect to some outcome variable or examine cross-sectional 
differences at the country level (e.g., Daske et al., [2008], Armstrong et al., [2010], Landsman, 
Maydew, and Thornock [2012]).4 Our study shows that firm-level heterogeneity in reporting 
incentives plays a significant role for the capital-market effects around IAS/IFRS adoptions. In 
doing so, we contribute to the literature on the importance of firms’ reporting incentives (e.g., 
Ball, Robin, and Wu [2003], Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki [2003], Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz 
[2006]). Much of this literature has focused on differences in countries’ institutions as a driver of 
reporting incentives. We extend this literature by applying the notion of reporting incentives to 
within-country tests based on firm-level changes, rather than broad and relatively stable cross-
country differences (in levels). Second, our evidence demonstrates that concerns about selection 
                                                 
3  We further show that the results hold for alternative IAS coding schemes, including a very strict scheme that 
requires an explicit auditor’s attestation of IAS/IFRS reporting, as well as for voluntary U.S. GAAP adoptions. 
4  There exist a few studies that provide cross-sectional analyses at the firm level around IAS/IFRS adoptions 
(e.g., Christensen, Lee, and Walker [2007], Karamanou and Nishiotis [2009], Byard, Li, and Yu [2011]). 
However, they either have much narrower samples or do not focus on the heterogeneity in the effects and the 
underlying reasons for it. 
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effects around IAS/IFRS adoptions are to be taken seriously, particularly for voluntary adoptions, 
and that one has to exercise caution in attributing observed capital-market effects solely to the 
switch in standards. Instead, the effects could also reflect changes in the economics of the firm 
that affect managers’ reporting incentives. On a more descriptive level, the paper makes a third 
contribution. It provides comprehensive evidence on voluntary IAS reporting around the globe 
and highlights that, because of the large number of inconsistencies, commonly used accounting 
standards classifications in Worldscope and Global Vantage have to be used judiciously. 
Section 2 develops our hypotheses. In Section 3, we delineate our research design and 
describe the data. Section 4 presents the analyses and results. Section 5 concludes. In the 
Appendix we provide a comparison of commonly used accounting standards classifications and 
describe voluntary IAS/IFRS adoptions around the world. 
2. Hypothesis Development 
The starting point of our study is the notion that the underlying motivations for why managers 
change standards, including changes in firms’ economics, play a significant role for the economic 
consequences around IAS/IFRS adoptions. Some firms may adopt IAS merely in name without 
making material reporting changes. For others, economic changes (e.g., new growth 
opportunities) may provide management with incentives to enhance a firm’s reporting strategy 
and to strengthen its commitment to transparency. In this case, IAS adoption could be part of a 
broader set of changes. Similarly, there can be heterogeneous incentives around a mandate to 
report under IFRS; not all firms are likely to equally embrace such a mandate. As a result of such 
differences in incentives, and provided that markets are able to differentiate between them, there 
should be predictable heterogeneity in the economic effects around voluntary and mandatory 
IAS/IFRS adoptions. 
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Important antecedents for this paper are studies highlighting the role of firms’ reporting 
incentives in explaining observed accounting properties and actual practices.5 IAS or IFRS, like 
any other set of accounting standards, afford management with substantial discretion as their 
application involves judgment and the underlying measurements are often based on private 
information. The way in which firms use this discretion likely depends on managers’ reporting 
incentives, which are shaped by many factors, including countries’ institutional frameworks, 
various market forces, and firm characteristics. In this paper, we emphasize and test the role of 
firm-level incentives in the context of IAS/IFRS adoptions. 
Our main point is that because firms differ with respect to their reporting incentives as well as 
changes in them over time, it is difficult to attribute capital-market effects around IAS adoptions 
to the change in the standards alone. Observed capital-market effects around IAS adoptions likely 
also reflect changes in firm economics including the circumstances that led to IAS adoption in the 
first place. This creates a difficult identification and selection issue. To illustrate the point, our 
main hypothesis is that markets react more favorably to IAS adoptions around which firms make 
material and credible improvements to their overall reporting and disclosure policies. For 
instance, in a firm with a positive shock to its growth opportunities, management anticipates 
larger future financing needs, and hence sees more value in improving transparency.6 If 
management increases its commitment to transparency and among several changes voluntarily 
adopts IAS, then the switch in standards is associated with the change in commitment, but it is not 
the sole source of the improvement. It merely serves as a proxy. In contrast, markets should not 
                                                 
5  This literature essentially goes back to Watts and Zimmerman [1986]. Recent examples in the international 
literature are Ball, Kothari, and Robin [2000], Ball, Robin, and Wu [2003], Leuz [2003], Burgstahler, Hail, and 
Leuz [2006], and Bradshaw and Miller [2008]. These studies primarily focus on country-level incentives. 
6  This argument is similar to the bonding hypothesis. U.S. cross-listings are predicted to be more attractive for 
firms with large financing needs and growth opportunities and to entail higher costs for firms in which insiders 
consume substantial private benefits of control (e.g., Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz [2004]). 
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react (or could even react negatively) when firms only change the label of their accounting 
standards without making fundamental changes to their reporting. This heterogeneity provides the 
motivation for our stylized distinction between ‘serious’ and ‘label’ adopters. 
Importantly, we do not claim that ‘serious’ adopters experience positive effects because they 
comply strictly with IAS. We classify them as such because our proxies indicate a substantial 
change in the underlying incentives to improve transparency overall. Similarly, we cannot 
attribute any negative effects around ‘label’ adoptions to a lack of compliance with IAS. Instead, 
the effects could simply reflect reduced incentives for transparent reporting. Put differently, we 
do not attempt to identify the marginal effect of IAS adoption per se. To the contrary, a key point 
of our study is to illustrate that the estimated IAS coefficient cannot be attributed to the 
accounting standards alone, but likely also reflects differences in firms’ underlying motivations 
for IAS adoption. Thus, addressing the self-selection inherent in the voluntary adoption of IAS is 
not appropriate for our purposes, as we aim to highlight its existence, but doing so would be 
critical for studies aiming to isolate the effects of IAS reporting. Finding heterogeneity in the 
capital-market effects around IAS adoption does also not imply that standards do not matter. 
Standards and, specifically, voluntary IAS adoption can play an important role in firms’ 
commitment strategies (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia [2000]). But the heterogeneity implies that the 
change in standards alone is likely not responsible for the observed effects. 
In principle, there are several additional explanations for heterogeneous capital-market effects 
around IAS adoptions, which we attempt to rule out or address in our research design. First, it is 
possible that the use of IAS harmonizes reporting quality across firms. In this case, the 
heterogeneity in economic consequences around adoption mainly stems from prior reporting 
differences, rather than differences in firms’ motivations for IAS adoption. We therefore should 
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see positive capital-market effects for most IAS adopting firms, considering that IAS are viewed 
as more demanding and capital-market oriented relative to most local GAAP regimes, and the 
biggest effects should occur for the firms with the lowest reporting quality prior to the switch (all 
else equal). Given this alternative explanation, we focus on changes in firms’ reporting incentives 
around IAS adoption and include the pre-IAS level of the reporting proxies in the empirical model 
to control for prior differences in firms’ reporting practices. 
Second, IAS adoption itself could be almost costless, in particular in countries with low-
quality institutions (Ball [2006]). One concern then is that discretion in reporting standards and 
lack of enforcement make it difficult and very costly for investors to figure out the extent to 
which firms implement serious changes around IAS adoption. Thus, it is conceivable that there is 
little (economically meaningful) heterogeneity in the capital-market effects around IAS adoptions 
because investors cannot discern between serious and label adoptions. 
Third, it is possible that the heterogeneity in outcomes around voluntary IAS adoptions 
reflects heterogeneity in the standards themselves or in how firms use the standards. For instance, 
the set of IAS has changed and evolved considerably over the years (e.g., as a result of the 
IASC’s Core Standards Project or the Norwalk Agreement). Similarly, firms could use IAS to a 
varying degree (e.g., some claim to do IAS within the discretion provided by local GAAP while 
others provide a full-fledged set of IAS statements including auditor attestation). These 
differences across time and firms could lead to differential market reactions regardless of the 
underlying reporting incentives. To rule out this explanation, we provide additional tests limiting 
the heterogeneity in the standards (see Section 4.2). 
Finally, we note that it is difficult to predict market reactions around ‘label’ adoptions. One 
prediction is that label adoptions have no or a negligible effect. Alternatively, the market reaction 
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could be adverse, as a label adoption makes it apparent to investors that a firm is unwilling to 
commit to more transparency. Moreover, label adoptions could increase investor uncertainty, for 
example, because the change in standards makes it harder to forecast future earnings. But if 
markets unravel label adoptions and react unfavorably to them, it poses the question of why firms 
choose such adoptions in the first place. Again, it is important to recognize that the capital-market 
effects around ‘label’ adoptions are not necessarily attributable to the switch in standards per se. 
A negative market reaction could simply reflect changes in firm economics including a 
corresponding decrease in the commitment to transparency, rather than a response to the adoption 
of IAS. It is also possible that label adoptions are not very costly, yet offer (small) benefits that 
we do not measure in our analysis. For instance, firms could adopt IAS for contracting reasons. 
IAS could also be an investor-relations tool to improve communications with foreign investors, 
which could have an impact on foreign holdings, but less of an effect on liquidity (as one group of 
investors simply replaces another).7 It could also be that managers perceive a general trend to IAS 
and feel compelled to follow, but adopt IAS in the least costly way because there is no reason to 
adjust the reporting practices. Given all these possibilities, we do not sign our expectation for the 
effects of label adoptions relative to local GAAP firms.8 
3. Research Design and Data 
Our research design relies on variation in the underlying motives for IAS/IFRS adoption. We 
therefore focus on voluntary adoptions in our main analyses to increase the power of the tests, and 
                                                 
7  For instance, Tan, Wang, and Welker [2011] show that the IFRS mandate has differential effects on analyst 
forecasts depending on whether the analysts are local or foreign. 
8  Yet another explanation is that managers do not believe that markets unravel label adoptions. Prior capital-
market studies suggest that managers sometimes engage in accounting choices as if markets reward or fixate on 
these choices, despite the fact that studies show that markets see through these choices (e.g., Watts and 
Zimmerman [1986], Kothari [2001]). 
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use changes in firms’ reporting incentives to illustrate the selection issue. Doing so, we need a 
variable indicating when a firm has voluntarily adopted IAS, a variable capturing the changes in 
firms’ reporting incentives to differentiate between ‘serious’ and ‘label’ adopters, as well as 
proxies for the economic outcomes and a set of controls. We estimate the following model: 
EconCon = !0 + !1 IAS + !2 Serious Adopters + " !j Controlsj + #. (1) 
EconCon stands for three proxies of economic consequences (i.e., price impact, bid-ask spreads, 
and cost of capital). IAS is a binary variable coded as ‘1’ for years in which a firm follows IAS. 
Serious Adopters denotes a binary classification that identifies firms with above-median changes 
in our reporting proxies around the adoption of IAS. With this model, we can compare the label 
adopters to the local GAAP firms (!1), the serious adopters to the label adopters (!2), and the 
serious adopters to the base group (!1+!2). Controlsj denotes a vector of control variables 
including fixed-effects. The next sections describe each of the model’s components. 
3.1 IAS REPORTING AND SERIOUS VERSUS LABEL CLASSIFICATION 
The coding of the IAS variables in Eq. (1) involves three steps. First, we construct a firm-year 
panel dataset with a binary IAS reporting variable. We deliberately use a broad classification 
when coding the binary IAS variable. Given our research question, we intend to capture a wide 
variety of adoption strategies, including firms with dual reporting, those that provide a 
reconciliation of local GAAP numbers to IAS, and those that merely create the appearance of IAS 
reporting. That is, our classification relies primarily on what firms claim they do. Second, we 
determine the actual switch year, i.e., the point in time when IAS reporting started. We provide 
details on these two steps in the Appendix.  
As a third step, we construct three proxies measuring changes in reporting incentives around 
the switch to IAS. We use these proxies to partition the IAS firms into serious and label adopters. 
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The underlying idea is that reporting incentives play a significant role for firms’ reporting 
strategies as well as the choice to voluntarily adopt IAS. Based on this logic, we attempt to 
identify firms that experience substantial increases in their reporting incentives around IAS 
adoption. These firms are likely to make major improvements to their reporting strategy. In 
contrast, there could be firms that adopt IAS without material changes or even decreases in 
reporting incentives. For example, these firms could adopt IAS because managers perceive a 
general trend to IAS/IFRS and feel pressured to follow, but then are less likely to materially 
adjust their reporting. Similarly, they could adopt IAS for contracting reasons and hence not be 
concerned with transparency to equity investors. 
Since reporting incentives are unobservable, we create three distinct proxies for the 
underlying construct: two focus on the determinants of firms’ incentives (and hence are input-
based); one relies on firms’ actual reporting behavior as a result of firms’ incentives (and hence is 
output-based). Our first partitioning variable reflects observable firm characteristics. Economic 
theory suggests that larger, more profitable firms with greater financing needs and growth 
opportunities, more international operations, and dispersed ownership have stronger incentives for 
transparent reporting to outside investors.9 We measure the Reporting Incentives variable as the 
first and primary factor (out of three that are retained) when applying factor analysis to the 
following six firm attributes: firm size (natural log of the US$ market value), financial leverage 
(total liabilities over total assets), profitability (return on assets), growth opportunities (book-to-
market ratio), ownership concentration (percentage of closely-held shares), and 
internationalization (foreign sales over total sales). The factor exhibits all the expected loadings 
                                                 
9  These determinants follow from the disclosure literature (see Leuz and Wysocki [2008] for a survey) and the 
cross-listing literature (e.g., Lang, Lins, and Miller [2003], Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz [2004]). 
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(i.e., increasing in size, leverage, profitability, growth, and foreign sales; decreasing in ownership 
concentration).10 
Our second partitioning variable relies on a simple accrual-based characterization of actual 
reporting. Sloan [1996] or Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan [2001] show that the decomposition 
of earnings into accruals and operating cash flow as well as extreme accruals contain important 
information. Furthermore, the ratio of accruals to cash flows has been shown to produce plausible 
earnings management rankings for firms around the world (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki [2003], 
Wysocki [2004]).11 Following Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki [2003], we compute the Reporting 
Behavior variable as the ratio of the absolute value of accruals to the absolute value of cash flows 
(multiplied by -1 so that higher values indicate more transparent reporting). Scaling by the 
operating cash flow serves as a performance adjustment (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley [2005]). We 
estimate accruals as the difference between net income before extraordinary items and the cash 
flow from operations or, if unavailable, compute them following the balance-sheet approach in 
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1995].12 
                                                 
10  To maximize sample size we replace missing values for ownership concentration and foreign sales with zero. 
Unreported sensitivity analyses show that our results do not hinge on the composition of the factor score. When 
we re-run our analyses eliminating, one-by-one, each firm attribute (or replacing market value with total assets 
and dropping the book-to-market ratio), the results are not materially affected. 
11  We acknowledge that it is difficult to consistently assess the actual reporting behavior across many firms and 
countries. To mitigate these concerns, we (i) use the reporting variables only to partition the IAS firms and not 
directly as test variables, (ii) base all our cross-sectional analyses on changes in the reporting incentives proxies, 
(iii) do not analyze changes in the accruals proxy per se but focus on the capital-market consequences of IAS 
adoption, and (iv) always include the (pre-IAS) level of our partitioning variable as a control. 
12  We recognize that a change in accounting standards could have mechanical effects on the magnitude of 
accruals. However, as IAS tend to be more accruals-based than local standards around the world (e.g., Hung 
[2001], Ding et al. [2006]), this effect likely works against our expectations. In addition, we control for the 
variability in firms’ operations as suggested by Hribar and Nichols [2007]. That is, we first regress the ratio of 
absolute accruals to cash flows on the standard deviation of cash flows, and then use the residuals as our 
Reporting Behavior variable. This procedure accounts for the variability in operations that potentially biases 
unsigned accruals measures. The results (not tabulated) remain largely unchanged using this alternative metric. 
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The idea behind the third partitioning variable is to capture external changes affecting firms’ 
reporting incentives, such as the scrutiny by analysts and financial markets. Lang and Lundholm 
[1996] show that analyst coverage is related to more transparent reporting. Evidence in Lang, 
Lins, and Miller [2004], and Yu [2008] suggests a monitoring role of financial analysts, for 
instance, in curbing earnings management. We compute the Reporting Environment variable as 
the natural log of the number of analysts following the firm (plus one). For firms without 
coverage in I/B/E/S we set analyst following to zero. A nice feature of this variable is that it does 
not rely on accounting information, and is free of mechanical accounting effects that likely occur 
around the switch to a new set of accounting standards.13 
Next, to reduce measurement errors and allow for the possibility that incentives change slowly 
over time, we compute the rolling average (over the years t, t-1, t-2, relative to the year t of IAS 
adoption) for each reporting variable. We then use this rolling average in two ways: first, we 
include it as a separate control in Eq. (1) for differences in the level of firms’ reporting incentives. 
Higher values indicate stronger incentives for transparent reporting. Second, we compute changes 
in the reporting variables around IAS adoption by subtracting the rolling average in year t-1 
(computed over the years t-3 to t-1) from the rolling average in year t+3 (computed over the years 
t+1 to t+3). We center the computation on year t=0 to obtain non-overlapping observations from 
the pre and post period and to exclude potentially contaminating effects from the adoption year 
itself. We then use the distribution of the changes around IAS adoption (with each firm 
                                                 
13  We find very similar results using analyst forecast dispersion as a proxy for firms’ Reporting Environment (not 
tabulated). 
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represented once) to classify IAS firms with above median changes as Serious Adopters (coded as 
‘1’) and with below median changes as label adopters (see also Panel A in Table 4).14 
We assess the construct validity of the three reporting variables by computing the Spearman 
correlations between the proxies (ranging from ! = 0.18 between Reporting Environment and 
Reporting Behavior to ! = 0.54 between Reporting Environment and Reporting Incentives), and 
by correlating them with related reporting variables, for which we have only limited samples at 
hand. For instance, we find significantly positive correlations for the Reporting Incentives and the 
Reporting Environment variables with (i) a disclosure quality index created by business 
professionals in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland (Daske and Gebhardt [2006]), (ii) having a 
Big Five auditor, and (iii) the extent of disclosure (measured by the number of pages in the annual 
report, after adjusting for country effects, firm size and performance).15 
3.2 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
In studying the economic consequences around IAS adoptions, we use proxies for market 
liquidity, information asymmetry, and the cost of capital, which – among other things – should 
reflect the quality of financial disclosure and reporting (e.g., Verrecchia [2001]; Lambert, Leuz 
and Verrecchia [2007]). This approach sidesteps the difficulties of explicitly measuring changes 
in reporting quality around IAS adoption. 
                                                 
14  In untabulated sensitivity analyses, we also compute the cut-off value based on the entire distribution of changes 
in the respective reporting variable around any given year (thus including non-IAS firms and years other than 
the IAS adoption year). Alternatively, we rank the changes in the reporting variables around IAS adoption into 
deciles, and then use the ranks to estimate the differential economic consequences of serious and label adopters. 
In each case, the results look similar to those in the main analysis and none of the inferences change. 
15  Ultimately, partitions based on the three proxies are unlikely to produce consistent and sensible results if they 
fail to capture the underlying construct. In this sense, the cross-sectional analyses can also be seen as a 
validation exercise of the three partitioning variables. 
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The first dependent variable is a measure of illiquidity suggested by Amihud [2002] and 
inspired by Kyle’s [1985] lambda. We measure Price Impact, i.e., the ability of an investor to 
trade in a stock without moving its price, as the yearly median of the Amihud [2002] illiquidity 
measure (computed daily and equal to the absolute stock return divided by the US$ trading 
volume). Higher values indicate more illiquid stocks. To avoid the misclassification of days with 
no or low trading activity (i.e., days potentially yielding a price impact of zero), we omit zero-
return days from the computation of the yearly medians. 
The second dependent variable is the Bid-Ask Spread, which is a commonly used proxy for 
information asymmetry (e.g., Welker [1995], Leuz and Verrecchia [2000], Lang, Lins, and 
Maffett [2012]). We use the yearly median of the daily quoted spreads, which we compute as the 
difference between the closing bid and ask prices divided by the mid-point. 
The third dependent variable is Cost of Capital. We follow Hail and Leuz [2006] and compute 
the mean implied cost of equity capital using four models suggested by Claus and Thomas [2001], 
Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan [2001], Easton [2004], and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 
[2005]. These models are consistent with discounted dividend valuation but rely on different 
earnings-based representations. We substitute market price and analyst forecasts into each 
valuation equation and back out the cost of capital as the internal rate of return that equates 
current stock price and the expected future sequence of residual incomes or abnormal earnings. 
See the appendix in Hail and Leuz [2006] for details on the cost of capital proxies we apply.16 
                                                 
16  We recognize that there is a debate about the empirical validity of implied cost of capital estimates (e.g., 
Botosan and Plumlee [2005], Easton and Monahan [2005]). One alternative is to use realized returns as a proxy 
for expected returns. However, this proxy has many drawbacks as well, especially with short time series (Elton 
[1999]). We therefore go down a different route and use proxies for liquidity and information asymmetry as 
these constructs also capture differences in reporting quality (Leuz [2003], Lang, Lins, and Maffett [2012]). 
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We measure the dependent variables as of month +10 after the fiscal year end for which we 
code the accounting standards. We choose this month to ensure that firms’ annual reports are 
publicly available and priced at the time of the computations. For variables that are computed 
over an entire year, we start the computation as of month -2 through month +10 relative to the 
firm’s fiscal year end. 
3.3 CONTROL VARIABLES 
We include industry-, country-, and year-fixed effects in all regression models, and hence 
control for differences in countries’ adoption rates as well as time trends. In unreported analyses, 
we also check that our results are robust when we include country-year-fixed effects to control for 
country-wide shifts in the adoption rates over time, e.g., due to the announcement of mandatory 
IFRS reporting. Thus, the Serious Adopters coefficient reflects within-country differences relative 
to local GAAP firms and label adopters. 
In addition, we introduce the following binary indicators (see also Daske et al. [2008]): U.S. 
Listing is equal to one if the shares are traded over-the-counter or cross-listed on a U.S. exchange 
(Hail and Leuz [2009]). We separately code firms that voluntarily report under U.S. GAAP, but 
without a U.S. cross listing. We set New Markets equal to one if shares are traded on an exchange, 
which specializes in technology and other high-growth stocks and has listing requirements that 
mandate or allow IAS reporting. Index Member represents firms whose shares are constituents of 
national or international stock market indices as defined in Worldscope. 
In the liquidity regressions, we control for firm size, share turnover, and return variability 
(Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam [2000], Leuz and Verrecchia [2000]). Firm size is the Market 
Value of equity in US$ million. Share Turnover is the accumulated US$ trading volume divided 
by the market value of outstanding equity. Return Variability is computed as annual standard 
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deviation of monthly stock returns. We compute share turnover and return variability from month 
-2 through month +10 relative to a firm’s fiscal year end, and lag the market variables by one year 
to mitigate confounding effects from contemporaneous measurement. 
In the cost-of-capital specifications, we follow Hail and Leuz [2009] and control for firm size 
measured as Total Assets (in US$ million), Financial Leverage equal to the ratio of total liabilities 
to total assets, and Return Variability. We also control for Forecast Bias equal to the one-year-
ahead analyst forecast error scaled by lagged total assets. First, it is possible that the adoption of 
IAS impairs analysts’ ability to forecast earnings, at least during a transitional period. Second, 
any bias in analyst forecasts could mechanically affect our implied cost of capital estimate if 
markets back out the bias (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee [2005], Hail and Leuz [2006]). Finally, we 
control for inflation because analyst forecasts are expressed in nominal terms and local currency. 
We measure Inflation as the yearly median of one-year-ahead realized monthly changes in the 
consumer price index in a country.17 
3.4 DATA 
We obtain financial data from Worldscope, return, bid-ask spread, and trading volume data 
from Datastream, and analyst forecasts and share price data for the cost of capital estimation from 
I/B/E/S. The sample consists of all Worldscope firms from 1990 to 2005 for which we have the 
necessary data to compute the variables described above.18 Table 1 presents the distribution of 
firms reporting under IAS/IFRS, U.S. GAAP, or local GAAP by country (Panel A) and year 
(Panel B). The total sample consists of 69,528 firm-year observations across 30 countries, of 
                                                 
17  Using countries’ risk-free rates rather than the inflation rate yields very similar results and inferences. 
18  Our main sample ends on December 31, 2005, because IFRS became mandatory in many countries thereafter. 
We further require firms to have total assets of 10 US$ million, and countries to have at least one voluntary IAS 
observation. The latter two design choices do not affect the inferences drawn from the analyses. 
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which 4,155 are coded as IAS.19 The number of IAS firms increases considerably over time. By 
2004, almost 9% of the sample firms have adopted IAS. Similarly, the number of U.S. GAAP 
firms increases, but remains at a relatively small 2%. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variables (Panel A) and the control 
variables (Panel B) across the IAS adopters and local GAAP firms. Spread and price impact are 
right-skewed and could exhibit multiplicative relations with the control variables. Thus, as is 
common in the literature on micro-structure models, we estimate a log-linear specification and 
use the natural log of these measures in the analyses. 
4. Results 
4.1 AVERAGE EFFECTS ACROSS IAS AND LOCAL GAAP FIRMS 
We begin our analysis by examining average differences in market liquidity and cost of 
capital between firms reporting under IAS and firms reporting under local GAAP. We use cross-
sectional, time-series panel regressions, which benchmark IAS firms against local GAAP firms 
and against their own local GAAP history before adoption. Estimating average effects allows a 
comparison with prior work. We estimate the empirical specification in Eq. (1), but without the 
Serious Adopters variable. For each dependent variable, we estimate three regressions using either 
the level of the Reporting Incentives, the Reporting Behavior, or the Reporting Environment 
variable as a control. If these proxies capture incentives for more transparent reporting, they 
                                                 
19  In several sample countries, IAS reporting was not permissible to satisfy local reporting requirements during the 
sample period (e.g., U.K. and Canada). Nonetheless, firms in these countries could voluntarily provide a second 
set of financial statements in accordance with IAS/IFRS while filing primary accounts that comply with local 
reporting requirements. We check that our results are not affected by the inclusion of these countries. 
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should exhibit a negative coefficient in the model. Table 3 presents results from OLS regressions 
with robust standard errors that are clustered by firm.20 
Using price impact as dependent variable, the coefficients on IAS are insignificant, suggesting 
that firms voluntarily reporting under IAS – on average – have similar liquidity as local GAAP 
firms. The control variables behave as expected. Importantly, all three reporting variables are 
negatively associated with price impact, consistent with the idea that these proxies capture firms’ 
incentives for transparent reporting. Moreover, cross listing in the U.S., which among other things 
represents a commitment to transparency, is associated with a strong reduction in price impact (in 
line with, e.g., Foerster and Karolyi [1999], and Baruch, Karolyi, and Lemmon [2007]). Both the 
results for the reporting variables and U.S. cross listing make it unlikely that lack of power is 
responsible for the weak IAS results. There are also liquidity differentials for firms on new 
markets (consistent with high growth, high risk firms), constituents of major stock indices 
(consistent with large, well established and less risky firms), and firms with larger market 
valuations, higher share turnover, and higher return variability. The coefficient on voluntary U.S. 
GAAP is insignificant. In the model with firm-fixed effects (not tabulated), the IAS coefficient is 
significantly negative, providing a first indication that heterogeneity across firms matters. 
Next, we present the bid-ask spread results. Two models suggest that firms reporting under 
IAS have significantly larger spreads; the third model suggests the opposite. This may seem 
surprising, but it should be noted that in Table 3 we include IAS firms for which we are unable to 
identify the switch year (see Table A4, Panel B, in the Appendix). Thus, the IAS coefficient could 
                                                 
20  We also estimate the average effects model (i) replacing the country- and industry-fixed effects with firm-fixed 
effects, and (ii) omitting the IAS firms without identifiable switch year. The first test essentially controls for 
time-invariant and potentially unobserved differences between firms. The second test limits the sample to the 
same set of IAS firms that we use in the subsequent cross-sectional analyses. The results of both sensitivity tests 
(not tabulated) are similar to those reported in the tables, unless we discuss differences in the text. 
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also reflect cross-sectional differences between IAS and local GAAP firms that are not fully 
controlled for in our specification. Consistent with this explanation, the IAS coefficient becomes 
significantly negative in the firm-fixed effects model (not tabulated).21 This finding underscores 
the importance of requiring a switch year in the subsequent analyses. The control variables 
exhibit associations similar to those in the price impact model. 
The final three columns in Table 3 report the cost-of-capital results. Similar to the spread 
regressions, two of the IAS coefficients are positive and significant, indicating that IAS firms on 
average have a higher cost of capital than local GAAP firms.22 Unlike for spreads, this result 
continues to hold in the firm-fixed effects specification (not tabulated). The three reporting 
variables are always significantly negative, consistent with the idea that these variables capture 
differences in firms’ reporting incentives.23 Most of the remaining control variables are highly 
significant and have the expected signs.24 
In sum, the three reporting variables exhibit significant associations consistent with the idea 
that these variables capture differences in firms’ reporting incentives. The average economic 
consequences associated with voluntary IAS adoptions are mixed. One explanation for these 
mixed results could be substantial heterogeneity across firms, in which case examining the 
average effect can be misleading. We explore this possibility next. Before that, however, we note 
                                                 
21  Similarly, when we omit IAS firms without identifiable switch year, the IAS coefficients across the three bid-
ask spread models are negative (but only significant in Model 2). 
22  Daske [2006], examining a broad sample of German firms, also finds that voluntary IAS adopters exhibit higher 
costs of equity capital than local GAAP firms. 
23  This relation is also economically significant. For instance, a one-standard-deviation increase in the reporting 
variables implies a decrease in the cost of capital of 183 (Reporting Incentives), 33 (Reporting Behavior), and 
43 basis points (Reporting Environment), respectively. More realistically, a one-percent change in the reporting 
incentives variables implies a decrease in the cost of capital between 1 and 9 basis points. 
24  The significantly positive coefficients on U.S. Listing and Total Assets in Model 1 are primarily due to the 
inclusion of contemporaneous market values when computing the Reporting Incentives variable (see also Hail 
and Leuz [2009]). When we replace market values with total assets in this computation, we find a significantly 
negative coefficient for U.S. cross-listings. 
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that our findings in Table 3 are important because they are inconsistent with the notion that 
voluntary IAS adoption itself constitutes a commitment to increased disclosure. Such a 
commitment effect for the average or most firms would be surprising considering that firms have 
substantial flexibility in how they adopt IAS, and in light of descriptive evidence that there are 
major differences in the quality of IAS financial statements (e.g., Cairns [1999], [2001], Barth, 
Landsman, and Lang [2008]). 
4.2 HETEROGENEITY IN EFFECTS ACROSS SERIOUS AND LABEL ADOPTERS 
We begin the analyses in this section with descriptive statistics for the three reporting 
variables used to split the voluntary IAS firms into serious and label adopters, and report them in 
Table 4. In Panel A, we tabulate the level of the reporting variables in the year immediately 
before the switch to IAS and the changes around IAS adoption that serve to create the binary 
Serious Adopters indicators. The panel provides three insights. First, the pre-adoption level is 
substantially higher for label adopters than for serious adopters. This indicates that label adopters 
have less room for improvement and are not necessarily firms with poor reporting practices to 
begin with. Second, for serious adopters, the mean (median) change in all three reporting 
variables is positive, suggesting an increase in their incentives for transparency. Yet, the average 
change for label adopters is negative. Third, the average changes are quite large suggesting a 
substantial shift in reporting incentives around IAS adoption. For instance, the mean change in 
Reporting Incentives equals -0.264 for label adopters and +0.359 for serious adopters, relative to 
the pre-IAS level of 0.227. Table 4 also reports the distribution of serious and label adopters by 
country (Panel B) and year (Panel C). The two types of firms occur in almost any country and no 
clustering is apparent. The number of serious adopters exceeds the number of label adopters in the 
early years, but the pattern reverses in the later years (except for 2004). 
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Next, in Table 5, we provide median values and the number of observations for the dependent 
variables across label and serious adopters, and local GAAP firms. We only include IAS firms 
with identifiable switch years (to distinguish between serious and label adopters) and ‘pure’ local 
GAAP firms (to control for time-period effects). As Panels A and B show, serious adopters have 
higher stock market liquidity than label adopters, which in turn have higher liquidity than local 
GAAP firms. For instance, in the Reporting Incentives partition, the price impact for serious 
adopters is 0.046 compared to 0.111 (0.185) for label adopters (local GAAP firms). Except in one 
case, the differences are all statistically significant. In Panel C, we compare the cost of capital 
across groups. In the Reporting Incentives partition, the serious adopters have lower costs of 
capital than local GAAP firms; label adopters have the highest costs of capital. The results in the 
other two partitions are inconclusive (or opposite). 
We then present OLS regression estimates of Eq. (1) in Table 6.25 For price impact, we find 
that the coefficients on the Serious Adopters indicator are always negative and significant 
regardless of the partitioning variable we use. That is, serious adopters are more liquid than label 
adopters and, as indicated by the significant F-test, more liquid than local GAAP firms. This 
finding suggests substantial and predictable heterogeneity in the price impact effects, and is 
consistent with the notion that serious adopters increase their commitment to transparency around 
IAS adoption. The IAS coefficient is significantly positive in the Reporting Incentives and 
Reporting Environment partitions, indicating that label adopters exhibit lower market liquidity 
than local GAAP firms. The control variables behave similar as in Table 3. Notably, the three 
                                                 
25  Compared to Table 3 the number of IAS firms is substantially lower (i) because we omit firms without switch 
year, and (ii) due to the required data to compute changes in the reporting variables (see also Table 4, Panel A). 
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reporting variables (in levels) are still negatively associated with price impact.26 The fact that we 
find higher liquidity for serious adopters after controlling for the pre-IAS level of the respective 
partitioning variable suggests that our results are not driven by prior differences in reporting 
incentives. It is also inconsistent with the notion that voluntary adoptions lead to a convergence of 
reporting practices. 
The bid-ask spread results closely resemble those for price impact. The Serious Adopters 
coefficient is always significantly negative and so is the joint effect with the IAS variable. Thus, 
serious adopters have smaller bid-ask spreads compared to label adopters and local GAAP firms. 
For the label adopters, the effect is significantly positive in two of the three regressions. To gauge 
the economic magnitude, we compare the post-adoption means with the pre-adoption mean 
spread under local GAAP (i.e., 0.033 in Table 2, Panel A). The coefficients in Table 6 indicate an 
average decrease in spreads for serious adopters between 6.9 percent (Reporting Environment) 
and 11.4 percent (Reporting Incentives). Label adopters see a modest increase of 6.4 percent 
(Reporting Incentives) or smaller. The spread differences between serious and label adopters 
range from 17.8 percent (Reporting Incentives) to 7.6 percent (Reporting Behavior).27 These 
effects are economically significant, as we would expect if these firms experience large changes 
in their reporting incentives and, in turn, make changes to their commitment to transparency. 
For the cost of capital, we find that serious adopters exhibit a significantly lower cost of 
capital than label adopters in two of the three models. However, compared to local GAAP firms, 
the net effect is significantly negative only in the Reporting Incentives partition. In the remaining 
                                                 
26  We compute the reporting variables for the respective year, except for IAS firms, for which we use the pre-IAS 
mean. Using the pre-IAS level in the panel regression prevents these variables from picking up the changes in 
reporting incentives around IAS adoption, which we use to construct the serious versus label partitions. 
27  The economic magnitudes are in a similar range for the other two dependent variables (i.e., slightly lower for 
the cost of capital and larger for price impact). 
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cases, the combined coefficient is not distinguishable from zero. Thus, there is at best weak 
evidence suggesting a decline in the cost of capital for serious adopters. Furthermore, the IAS 
main effect is significantly positive throughout, suggesting that label adopters have a higher cost 
of capital than local GAAP firms. 
As discussed in Section 2, there are several explanations for the positive IAS coefficients in 
the liquidity and cost of capital regressions. First, it is important to recall that our analysis so far 
cautions us against interpreting the positive coefficients as attributable to label adoption per se. 
They likely reflect the negative changes in firms’ reporting incentives around IAS adoption, and 
hence a deterioration of transparency (see Panel A of Table 4). In that sense, seeing adverse 
economic consequences around IAS adoption is not surprising. That said, there are other possible 
explanations. For instance, label adoptions might not be that costly to begin with and firms could 
obtain other (small) benefits (that we do not analyze), which in turn make label adoptions 
worthwhile.28 Alternatively, managers could perceive a general trend to IAS/IFRS and feel 
pressured to follow, even though they do not want to adjust their reporting practices by much.29 
We further note that the positive IAS coefficients are less robust than the negative (incremental) 
effect of serious adoption (see also Section 4.4). 
In sum, the cross-sectional analyses confirm our main hypothesis that there is substantial 
heterogeneity in economic outcomes around IAS adoptions, and that these differences predictably 
                                                 
28  It could be that IAS adoption is a public relations tool for these firms (e.g., in communications with foreigners) 
and that it has an impact on foreign holdings, but less so on liquidity as one group of investors simply replaces 
another (e.g., Covrig, DeFond, and Hung [2007]). See also Tan, Wang, and Welker [2011] for related results. 
29  Consistent with such a ‘bandwagon’ effect, label adoptions become relatively more frequent as the trend 
towards IAS accelerates (see Table 4, Panel C). We also note that there are a large number of serious adopters in 
2004. These firms are likely stronger firms that voluntarily adopt ahead of the IFRS mandate to signal their type 
(see also Daske et al. [2008]). In addition, when we re-estimate our main regressions separately for the sub-
periods pre and post the completion of the IASC’s Core Standards Project in 1997 (not tabulated), we find that 
the main effect of the IAS indicator variable is generally more positive in the post-1997 period. This is what one 
would expect if these firms are compelled by the overall trend towards IAS/IFRS. 
 27 
line up with the degree to which firms exhibit substantial changes in their reporting incentives. In 
addition, the findings suggest that (at least some) investors can successfully distinguish between 
different adoption types and do not reward all firms irrespective how they adopt IAS. 
4.3 HETEROGENEITY IN THE STANDARDS AND MANDATORY IFRS ADOPTION 
In this section, we explore the alternative explanation that heterogeneous effects around 
voluntary IAS adoptions reflect heterogeneity in the standards that are being adopted. The set of 
IAS has changed considerably over the years. Similarly, firms do not always fully adopt IAS. 
Such heterogeneity across time and firms could lead to differential effects across voluntary IAS 
adoptions, and hence could be a potential explanation for our findings. 
We conduct three sets of tests to gauge the importance of this explanation: first, we re-
estimate our analyses using a very narrow definition of what constitutes voluntary IAS thereby 
reducing the heterogeneity in the standards that voluntary IAS adopters follow. Second, we apply 
the serious versus label distinction to firms around the mandatory switch to IFRS. In principle, 
our reporting incentives argument should also apply to mandatory IFRS adopters, in particular 
considering that the mandate forces firms to adopt IFRS, and hence there are likely some firms 
that would have preferred to continue reporting under local GAAP. At the same time, 
heterogeneity in the standards is less of an issue for mandatory IFRS adoption. Thus, if our results 
for voluntary adoptions were driven primarily by heterogeneity in the standards, we should not 
obtain similar or at least considerably weaker results around mandatory adoptions. Third, we 
study voluntary U.S. GAAP adoptions, for which there has been a complete set of accounting 
standards for the entire sample period. We present the results from the first two tests in this 
section. The voluntary U.S. GAAP results follow in Section 4.4. 
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Table 7, Panel A, reports liquidity and cost-of-capital results across serious and label adopters 
using a very strict (and narrow) definition of what constitutes IAS reporting. That is, starting with 
the augmented Worldscope accounting standards classification, we impose two additional criteria: 
first, we limit the sample period to the years 1998 to 2005. In 1998, the IASC finished a major 
revision of its core standards and from this point onwards IAS were considered a complete set of 
standards. The revised standards also eliminated many optional accounting treatments. Second, 
we require an explicit auditor attestation of compliance with IAS or IFRS. To do so, we manually 
check whether the auditor’s report contains a statement like “in our opinion, the consolidated 
financial statements … are in accordance with the IAS as issued by the IASB.”30 
As shown in the table, using a stricter IAS definition nearly cuts the sample of IAS firms in 
half, and we lose several countries for which there are no longer any IAS adopters. Nonetheless, 
the results remain very similar to those before. Even for this narrow sample, there is no evidence 
that IAS adoption on average improves liquidity or lowers the cost of capital. For both liquidity 
variables, the Serious Adopters coefficient (net effect) is negative and generally significant, 
indicating that serious adopters have lower price impact and bid-ask spreads than label adopters 
(local GAAP firms). The cost-of-capital results are similar to Table 6, except that serious adopters 
are not different from local GAAP firms in a statistical sense. 
Next, we apply our partitioning technique to mandatory IFRS adoption. We limit the sample 
to the subset of countries from Table 1 that switched to IFRS reporting for consolidated financial 
statements by the end of 2005, and only cover the years 2002 to 2005. We define a binary IFRS 
indicator for firms that are required to adopt IFRS for the first time, and use it in place of the IAS 
                                                 
30  To avoid a reduction in sample size due to gaps in our panel of annual reports, we require such a statement 
within the first three years after IAS adoption. However, the results are qualitatively the same if we limit the 
analyses to IAS firms with an auditor’s attestation in the actual year of the switch. 
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variable. Consequently, we identify the market effects relative to the firms’ own pre-adoption 
years and the firms in the same countries that have not yet or did not adopt IFRS (i.e., we 
eliminate voluntary IAS firms from the analyses). We split the mandatory IFRS adopters into 
serious and label firms using the same partitioning technique as before. For each reporting 
variable we compute the change around the mandated switch (thereby utilizing data up to 2008), 
and assign the Serious Adopters indicator to the firms with above-median changes. The rest of the 
model specification is the same as in Eq. (1). 
Panel B of Table 7 reports the results for liquidity and cost of capital around mandatory IFRS 
adoption. Throughout, the Serious Adopters coefficient is negative and, with one exception, 
significant. Hence, firms with relatively large increases in reporting incentives exhibit higher 
liquidity and lower cost of capital than firms that adopt IFRS only in name. In five out of the nine 
specifications, market liquidity (cost of capital) is also significantly higher (lower) for serious 
adopters than for local GAAP firms. Moreover, price impact and bid-ask spreads are higher for 
label adopters than for local GAAP firms. Such a positive coefficient on IFRS is not surprising if 
we correctly identify firms that were forced to adopt IFRS, but would have preferred local GAAP 
(see also Christensen, Lee, and Walker [2007]). This could also explain why the adverse effects 
for label adoptions appear to be larger around the mandate than around voluntary adoption.  
Overall, the evidence around mandatory adoptions is similar to the evidence around voluntary 
adoptions. This similarity makes it unlikely that heterogeneity in the standards across firms or 
time is the primary driver of our results. More importantly, the evidence in this section suggests 
that reporting incentives also matter for market outcomes around changes in mandatory reporting. 
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4.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
In this section, we test the sensitivity of our results to various research design choices and 
report results in Table 8. For brevity, we tabulate only the coefficients and t-statistics of the two 
IAS variables but, unless stated otherwise, estimate the regressions using the same models as in 
Table 6. First, in Panel A, we extend the analysis to three additional economic outcomes, namely 
Total Trading Costs (equal to the roundtrip transaction costs drawn from Lesmond, Ogden, and 
Trzcinka [1999]), Zero Returns (equal to the yearly proportion of trading days without stock price 
movements), and firm value defined as Tobin’s q. For a description of the variables and 
regression models see the notes to Table 8. The results using total trading costs are very similar to 
the liquidity results presented above. Serious adopters have lower trading costs than label 
adopters. The results are weaker using zero return days, but point in the same direction. In both 
cases, the net effect for serious adopters is significantly negative. The effect for label adopters is 
negative and significant in five out of six cases, indicating that the ‘adverse’ effects of label 
adoptions shown in Table 6 depend on the outcome variable and are not very robust. The Tobin’s 
q results are consistent with the cost-of-capital effects. In particular, serious adopters have higher 
firm values than label adopters and, in one case, than local GAAP firms.31 
Second, in Panel B, we evaluate whether the results are confined to IAS/IFRS.32 We extend 
the analysis by including voluntary U.S. GAAP adoptions by non-U.S. firms (that are not cross-
                                                 
31  Based on the mean pre-adoption Tobin’s q under local GAAP, serious adopters increase their q, on average, 
between 2.3 percent (Reporting Environment) and 13.7 percent (Reporting Incentives). Label adopters see a 
decrease between 3.9 percent (Reporting Behavior) and 23.4 percent (Reporting Incentives). These effects are 
economically significant and quite large (i.e., larger than the average effects of mandatory IFRS adoption in 
Daske et al. [2008], but smaller than the effects of U.S. cross-listing in Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz [2004]). But 
again, these effects should not be attributed to IAS/IFRS alone as they likely also reflect more fundamental 
changes (which happen to be correlated with IAS adoption). 
32  From here on, we report only the results for price impact as the dependent variable in the table, but the 
inferences are similar using bid-ask spreads and cost of capital. 
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listed in the U.S.). Combining IAS and U.S. GAAP or, alternatively, considering only voluntary 
U.S. GAAP adoptions yields essentially the same insights as before. Market liquidity is highest 
for serious adopters, while the differences between local GAAP firms and label adopters are 
usually not significant. These results highlight that our findings for the reporting partitions are not 
specific to voluntary IAS adoptions. Next, in tests not tabulated, we re-run our analyses using (i) 
the original Worldscope classification, (ii) the original Global Vantage classification, and (iii) the 
sub-sample of firms with manually coded accounting standards. We find that serious adopters 
have significantly higher levels of liquidity compared to label adopters and local GAAP firms, 
regardless of the accounting standards classification. This result may seem surprising in light of 
the many misclassifications across data sources documented in the Appendix. However, because 
our partitioning is independent of the accounting standards classification, it is also possible that 
many misclassifications end up in the label adopter category, for which we do not predict 
significant market reactions. 
Third, in Panel C, we gauge the effects of sample composition. We re-estimate the models 
excluding observations from the two countries with the largest contribution to the overall sample 
(i.e., the U.K. and Canada). Both countries did not allow IAS reporting for statutory purposes, and 
hence they have a small number of voluntary IAS adopters. Next, we limit the sample to only 
firms that actually switch to IAS reporting (reducing the sample to about 4,000 firm-years). The 
results indicate that our analyses remain largely unaffected by the differing sample definitions.33 
One concern about the research design is that several of our control variables as well as the 
inputs for the Reporting Incentives and Reporting Behavior variables use accounting numbers and 
                                                 
33  In further tests (not tabulated), we confirm that our results hold when we eliminate all sample restrictions 
(increasing the sample to 50 countries and a maximum of 135,538 firm-years), and when we use a random 
benchmark sample consisting of up to 150 non-IAS adopting firms per country and year. 
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that these numbers might change mechanically as a result of the switch to a different set of 
accounting standards. With regard to this concern, we first note that the models that combine 
liquidity proxies with the partition based on changes in analyst following do not rely on any 
accounting data. Table 6 shows that the results for these specifications are similar to the other 
models. Thus, we do not think that mechanical effects from the change in accounting standards 
induce our findings. Moreover, in Panel D of Table 8, when we re-estimate the cross-sectional 
analyses using firm-fixed effects and eliminate time-invariant unobserved firm attributes as 
potentially confounding factors, the results continue to hold, and the inferences are essentially the 
same as in our main analysis. 
Finally, in untabulated analyses, we explore the interplay between firm-level incentives and 
country-level institutional factors, which could act as substitutes or complements. For instance, in 
countries with strong capital-market incentives, one would expect firms to already report in a 
transparent fashion (under local GAAP) and hence when they switch to IAS, they do not need to 
improve their reporting. In contrast, firms in countries with weak institutions could seek to 
commit to more transparency (e.g., because they face new growth opportunities), and hence they 
adopt a series of measures to improve transparency, one of which is IAS. As shown in Panel B of 
Table 4, we do not observe any clustering of serious and label adoptions in certain countries. To 
assess this relation more formally, we run three additional tests. First, we construct two-by-two 
contingency tables for serious and label adopters with two commonly used country-level 
institutional factors, each split by the median (i.e., the Djankov, La Porta, and Lopez-de-Silanes 
[2008] anti-self dealing index, and the La Porta et al. [1997] rule of law index). We generally find 
no statistical relation. Second, we compute the Pearson correlation coefficients between the 
proportion of serious adopters per country and the two country-level factors. The correlations are 
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not significant. Third, we partition the sample countries into two groups and re-run our main 
regression analyses. We find that the heterogeneity in the capital-market effects around IAS 
adoption is present within countries with weak and strong institutions and not limited to a 
particular group of countries. These results are consistent with firm-level incentives having 
separate effects around IAS adoption that go beyond the effects of country-level institutions. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the economic consequences associated with voluntary and mandatory 
IAS/IFRS adoptions around the world. We focus on firm-level heterogeneity in the consequences, 
recognizing that firms can differ in their motivations and ways to adopt IAS/IFRS. Some firms 
may adopt new standards merely in name without making material changes to their reporting 
policies, while others adopt them as part of a broader strategy to strengthen their commitment to 
transparency. The possibility of such differences implies significant heterogeneity in the 
economic consequences around IAS/IFRS adoptions due to selection effects. 
To show the existence of such effects, we create three binary partitions that attempt to capture 
major changes in firms’ reporting incentives around voluntary IAS adoptions (based on various 
firm attributes, firms’ actual reporting behavior, and the external pressure from the reporting 
environment). We then examine the economic consequences around IAS adoptions for ‘label’ and 
‘serious’ firms in a large global panel from 1990 to 2005. 
We find little evidence that voluntary IAS adoptions are, on average, associated with an 
increase in market liquidity or a decline in the cost of capital. If anything, the effects go in the 
opposite direction. However, using our three partitions, we document substantial differences in 
the capital market effects around IAS adoptions and find that concurrent changes in firms’ 
reporting incentives play a significant role in explaining them. Specifically, serious adopters 
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exhibit economically and statistically lower price impact of trades, bid-ask spreads, and costs of 
capital relative to label adopters and local GAAP firms. Given that we use changes in the 
incentives variables to partition IAS adoptions and include the corresponding pre-IAS level as a 
control in the model, our results are unlikely to reflect prior differences in reporting incentives, 
reporting quality, or the reporting environment. 
Our evidence is inconsistent with the notion that IAS reporting per se constitutes a 
commitment to increased transparency. Consequently, one has to exercise caution in attributing 
capital market effects around voluntary IAS adoptions solely to the change in accounting 
standards. The observed effects are more likely to reflect changes in firms’ reporting incentives, 
including those that give rise to the decision to adopt IAS in the first place. One implication is 
that one could find, on average, positive, negative, or no capital-market effects around IAS 
adoptions depending on the composition of the sample, unless such differences are accounted for. 
As such, our results help explain the mixed findings in prior literature. 
Our study also contributes to the literature on the role of incentives for reporting outcomes 
and their capital-market effects. It highlights the role of firm-level incentives (in addition to or 
separate from country-level incentives) around voluntary IAS adoptions. The findings extend to 
voluntary U.S. GAAP adoptions and, more importantly, to mandatory IFRS adoptions. 
Furthermore, our study shows that markets can differentiate between serious and label adoptions. 
This is important as there is considerable concern that the global movement towards a single set 
of accounting standards masks the heterogeneity in actual reporting practices and makes it harder 
for investors to evaluate firms’ reporting quality. Our results do not support this concern. 
Finally, we caution the reader that our results should not be interpreted as indicating that 
‘serious’ adopters experience the documented effects because they strictly comply with 
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IAS/IFRS. Our partitions merely indicate that these firms experience substantial changes in their 
reporting incentives around IAS/IFRS adoption, which likely influences their reporting behavior 
more generally. For such firms, the market reaction likely reflects changes in the entire reporting 
or commitment strategy, not just the switch to IAS/IFRS. Thus, a key message of our paper is that 
in order to isolate the marginal effects of IAS/IFRS reporting, one has to push harder on the 
identification of such effects and, in particular, needs to separate them from reporting incentive 
effects. For this very reason, our results should not be read as suggesting that standards do not 
matter. While we show that reporting incentives play an important role for the sign and magnitude 
of the market reactions around IAS/IFRS adoptions, our tests are not designed to analyze the 
relative contribution of standards and incentives. We leave this issue to future research. 
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APPENDIX 
Classification of Voluntary IAS Adoptions around the World 
This appendix describes our coding of firm-year observations from firms following IAS/IFRS, 
U.S. GAAP, or local GAAP, and compares accounting standards classifications across different 
data sources.34 It also documents firms’ reporting patterns across countries and over time, and 
how we identify the year of voluntary IAS adoption. 
We use three main data sources to construct our panel of firms’ accounting standards: (i) 
Thomson Financial Worldscope (WS), (ii) Compustat Global Vantage (GV), and (iii) an 
extensive manual review of annual reports collected through Thomson Research. WS serves as 
starting point because its coverage is by far the most comprehensive. In addition, it is directly 
linked to Datastream, thereby reducing the potential for mismatches from combining accounting 
data with price data. Using the information on accounting standards followed (field 07536), we 
classify firm-year observations into the three categories IAS, U.S. GAAP, and local GAAP 
according to Panel A of Table A1. To assess the quality of commercially available databases, we 
also classify the same set of observations applying the GV coding scheme in Panel B of Table A1 
that is based on the accounting standards information in field “ASTD”.35 
We next conduct an extensive manual data collection and classification. We start by 
identifying potential voluntary IAS or U.S. GAAP adopters, i.e., firms with at least one firm-year 
coded as IAS or U.S. GAAP in either WS or GV before the end of 2005 (35,633 firm-years). We 
                                                 
34  We further illustrate our hand-coding providing examples of each case using excerpts from firms’ annual 
reports in an online appendix (available at http://research.chicagobooth.edu/arc/journal/onlineappendices.aspx). 
On this site, we also make the database of voluntary IAS reporting available for download. 
35 One of the drawbacks of commercial databases is that they attempt to capture many different reporting practices 
around the world, but often at the expense of consistency through time or across countries. Furthermore, the 
categories often do not provide clear distinctions between local GAAP and IAS, as is needed for our study. For 
instance, category 02 “International standards” in WS comprises not only IAS observations, but also firms 
following other non-local, non-U.S. standards (e.g., H.K. GAAP, U.K. GAAP). This problem is even more 
pronounced in GV as it has only three categories dedicated to international standards. 
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then gather the time-series of annual reports through Thomson Research, and were able to collect 
22,213 documents in electronic image format. Based on a manual review of the accounting 
principles’ footnote and the auditors’ report, we create our own accounting standards 
classification. We deliberately use a broad classification when coding the binary IAS variable. 
Given our research question, we intend to capture a wide variety of adoption strategies, including 
dual reporting, reconciliations of local GAAP numbers to IAS, or firms that merely create the 
appearance of IAS reporting. That is, our classification relies primarily on what firms claim they 
do. This leads to six reporting categories ranging from the exclusive use of IAS for consolidated 
financial statements to reporting under local GAAP together with a reconciliation of net income 
and/or shareholders’ equity to IAS (Table A1, Panel C). Importantly, for our manual coding, we 
require that the annual report contains an explicit reference to IAS/IFRS (U.S. GAAP) for the 
financial statements in the footnotes. We classify firms as local when they adopt only individual 
IAS or U.S. GAAP standards (e.g., for leasing or segment reporting). Finally, we complete firms’ 
time-series by filling in cases with missing individual annual reports, utilizing all data sources at 
hand (i.e., WS, GV, annual reports). This procedure results in a total hand-coded sample of 
27,589 firm-year observations. 
The main purpose of this massive hand-collection is to assess the suitability of commercially 
available databases for our research question. To gauge the effect of potential misclassifications, 
we tabulate firm-years across different classifications and report the number of observations and 
percentages in Table A2. For ease of comparison, we use the base sample from our main analyses 
(n=69,528). In Panel A, we compare the classifications across WS and GV. For our 
comprehensive WS coding (i.e., when using all categories listed in Table A1), we find that 2.4% 
of all firm-years are coded as IAS in WS but as local GAAP in GV (compared to 1.2% the other 
way round). Thus, the two data sources provide contradictory information on about every third 
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IAS firm-year observations (i.e., [7+844]/2,852 ! 30% when starting with GV; [26+1,658]/3,685 
! 46% when starting with WS). When we limit the WS coding to categories 02 and 23 and the 
GV coding to “DI” (labeled “Stricter Coding for IAS” in Panel A), the contradiction rates remain 
substantial (i.e., [7+921]/2,728 ! 34% for GV; [1+737]/2,538 ! 29% for WS). Panel B reports 
results from comparing the hand-coded classification to WS and GV. Neither commercial 
database clearly dominates, but both exhibit substantial classification differences relative to our 
manual review of annual reports, as indicated by large numbers of observations off the diagonals. 
Our hand-coding disagrees in about 25% of the cases with WS or GV, computed as the fraction of 
off-diagonal observations relative to the observations for which we have annual report data and 
WS (GV) information. Panel C reports Pearson correlations between the classifications. 
As a further validity check we compare the three coding schemes on a country-by-country 
basis. In Table A3 we tabulate the numbers and proportions of IAS and U.S. GAAP firms for all 
countries with a minimum of 20 observations and total assets available in a given year. The table 
highlights the larger coverage in WS, which identifies more than twice as many IAS firm-years 
than GV (13,001 versus 6,227). The hand-coded sample consists of 8,399 IAS firm-years. It 
further reveals that the proportion of IAS firms at the individual country-level varies substantially. 
For instance, the percentage of IAS adopters in Italy is as high as 78.7% according to WS but 
only 0.2% based on GV. The hand-coding, to which we added observations that are classified as 
local under both WS and GV, indicates a proportion of 25.1%. 
As a result of the above validity checks, we conduct our main analyses using an ‘augmented’ 
WS accounting standards classification, for which we use our hand-coded data together with the 
“Accounting Standard” field in GV to triangulate and correct the initial WS coding. This leads to 
2,202 cases for which our hand-coded data overrides conflicting WS information. Unless 
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indicated otherwise, the results presented in the study rely on the augmented WS coding to 
identify the IAS firm-year observations.36 
The final step involves identifying the switch year. As Table A4 illustrates, voluntary IAS 
adoption and reporting over time has taken many different forms and patterns. In its simplest 
form, a firm starts out reporting in accordance to local GAAP and then switches to IAS. In more 
complicated cases, firms switch back and forth between local GAAP and IAS multiple times, and 
also might switch to reporting in accordance with U.S. GAAP, for instance, as a result of a U.S. 
cross-listing. We assign IAS switch years only if we can manually confirm that out of two 
consecutive firm-years the first is classified as local GAAP and the second as IAS.37 
Consequently, we identify 845 firms with proper IAS switch years (Panel A), and exclude 570 
IAS reporting firms from the serious versus label partitions because we are unable to identify a 
switch year according to our definition (Panel B).38 
                                                 
36  For sensitivity purposes, we also re-run the analyses with the pure Worldscope, Global Vantage, or hand-coded 
classifications. In addition, we conduct tests using only IAS firms for which we can manually confirm 
IAS/IFRS reporting via explicit audit firm attestation in the annual report. See Sections 4.3 and 4.4 for details. 
37  We manually ensure that the splicing of different data sources does not introduce artificial IAS adoption years. 
Moreover, we do not consider a switch from U.S. GAAP to IAS as creating a valid switch year. 
38  We check that our results are not confounded by the many variations in firms’ IAS adoption patterns (not 
tabulated). Even in the most restrictive case, when we limit the group of IAS adopters to the 696 firms with only 
one switch from local GAAP to IAS, the inferences of our analyses remain unaffected. 
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 TABLE 1 
Sample Composition by Country and Year 
Panel A: Accounting Standards, Listing Status, and Index Membership by Country 



























Australia 983 5,412 66 1.2 3 0.1 703 13.0 58 1.1 2,892 53.4 
Austria 131 974 223 22.9 20 2.1 93 9.5 46 4.7 221 22.7 
Belgium 171 1,159 78 6.7! 8! 0.7! 27 2.3 0 0.0 302 26.1!
Bermuda 18 66 12 18.2! 25! 37.9! 9 13.6! 12 18.2 12 18.2 
Canada 1,277 7,554 7 0.1 122! 1.6! 1,458 19.3! 35 0.5! 2,802 37.1!
China 1,121 3,362 728 21.7! 21! 0.6! 127 3.8! 6 0.2! 89 2.6!
Czech Republic 55 159 42 26.4! 0! 0.0! 8 5.0! 0 0.0! 21 13.2!
Denmark 239 2,129 90 4.2! 2! 0.1! 16 0.8! 0 0.0! 309 14.5!
Finland 152 919 28 3.0! 0! 0.0! 24 2.6! 0 0.0! 226 24.6!
France 985 6,253 132 2.1! 44! 0.7! 197 3.2! 0 0.0! 2,499 40.0!
Germany 717 2,972 759 25.5! 363! 12.2! 101 3.4! 737 24.8! 567 19.1!
Greece 331 2,131 26 1.2! 4! 0.2! 36 1.7! 0 0.0! 616 28.9!
Hong Kong 730 4,871 60 1.2 13 0.3 613 12.6 50 1.0 1,186 24.3 
Hungary 35 207 125 60.4 6 2.9 31 15.0! 0 0.0! 12 5.8!
Israel 152 629 18 2.9! 158! 25.1! 69 11.0! 26 4.1! 190 30.2 
Italy 188 1,024 376 36.7 0 0.0 26 2.5 27 2.6 207 20.2 
Luxembourg 29 142 32 22.5! 17! 12.0! 23 16.2! 4 2.8! 67 47.2!
The Netherlands 288 2,187 44 2.0! 73! 3.3! 167 7.6! 41 1.9! 283 12.9!
Norway 240 1,619 15 0.9! 12 0.7 122 7.5 0 0.0 361 22.3 
Pakistan 86 583 44 7.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 449 77.0 
Peru 54 282 74 26.2 4 1.4! 38 13.5! 0 0.0! 98 34.8!
Poland 103 519 29 5.6! 2! 0.4! 18 3.5! 0 0.0! 97 18.7!
Portugal 100 599 10 1.7! 0! 0.0! 24 4.0! 0 0.0! 273 45.6!
Russian Federation 36 153 48 31.4! 14! 9.2! 87 56.9! 0 0.0! 6 3.9!
Singapore 456 2,367 25 1.1! 12! 0.5! 109 4.6! 1,879 79.4! 729 30.8!
South Africa 494 2,762 88 3.2! 1! 0.0! 370 13.4! 0 0.0! 851 30.8!
Sweden 370 2,408 40 1.7! 0! 0.0! 157 6.5! 7 0.3! 375 15.6!
Switzerland 283 2,076 747 36.0! 30! 1.4! 34 1.6! 8 0.4! 287 13.8!
Turkey 193 1,100 180 16.4! 0! 0.0! 25 2.3! 0 0.0! 656 59.6!
United Kingdom 2,154 12,910 9 0.1! 13! 0.1! 1,144 8.9! 747 5.8! 5,922 45.9!
Total 12,171! 69,528 4,155 6.0 967 1.4! 5,856! 8.4! 3,683! 5.3! 22,605! 32.5!
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Panel B: Accounting Standards, Listing Status, and Index Membership by Year 
  IAS/IFRS U.S. GAAP U.S. Listing New Markets Index Member 
Year Firms Firms % Firms % Firms % Firms % Firms % 
1990 1,225! 26! 2.1 4! 0.3! 112 9.1 38 3.1 476 38.9 
1991 1,877 43 2.3 8 0.4 154 8.2 43 2.3 700 37.3 
1992 2,371 59 2.5 9 0.4 179 7.5 62! 2.6 838 35.3!
1993 2,612! 61! 2.3 11! 0.4! 189! 7.2! 61! 2.3 886 33.9!
1994 2,983! 92! 3.1 15! 0.5! 226! 7.6! 55! 1.8 982 32.9 
1995 3,252 101 3.1 17 0.5 259 8.0 89 2.7 1,080 33.2 
1996 3,633 139 3.8 23 0.6 323 8.9 133! 3.7 1,214 33.4!
1997 4,355! 193! 4.4 25 0.6 396 9.1 157 3.6 1,401 32.2 
1998 4,664 220 4.7 31 0.7 445 9.5 169 3.6 1,569 33.6 
1999 5,496 318! 5.8 59! 1.1! 503! 9.2! 232! 4.2 1,837 33.4!
2000 5,904! 429! 7.3 94! 1.6! 534! 9.0! 348 5.9 1,983 33.6 
2001 6,853 552 8.1 163 2.4 622 9.1 579 8.4 2,212 32.3 
2002 7,224 616 8.5 161! 2.2! 637! 8.8! 660! 9.1 2,342 32.4!
2003 7,650! 618! 8.1 157! 2.1! 581! 7.6! 494! 6.5 2,215 29.0!
2004 7,321! 633! 8.6 163! 2.2 530 7.2 381 5.2 2,082 28.4 
2005 2,108! 55! 2.6 27! 1.3! 166! 7.9! 182! 8.6 788 37.4!
Total Firm-Years 69,528! 4,155 6.0 967 1.4 5,856 8.4 3,683 5.3 22,605 32.5 
 
The sample comprises a maximum of 69,528 firm-year observations from 30 countries with fiscal year ends between January 1, 1990, and December 31, 2005, for which 
we have sufficient Worldscope and Datastream data to estimate our base regressions (see Table 3). We exclude fiscal years of firms that are subject to mandatory IFRS 
reporting. We require firms to have total assets of 10 US$ million or more, and limit the sample to countries with at least one voluntary IAS firm-year observation. The 
table reports the number of unique firms as well as firm-year observations and percentages by country (Panel A) and year (Panel B) for the following indicator variables 
(coded as ‘1’ if the definition applies): IAS/IFRS and U.S. GAAP indicate financial reports in accordance with the respective accounting standards. We identify firms’ 
reporting standards based on the “accounting standards followed” field in Worldscope (field 07536), and adjust the coding for contradictory information from an 
extensive manual review of firms’ annual reports (see the Appendix for details). U.S. Listing marks firm-years from companies whose shares are traded over-the-counter 
or are exchange-listed in the U.S. (see Hail and Leuz [2009]). We do not include the U.S. listing observations in the U.S. GAAP indicator. New Market observations 
stem from firms traded on an exchange that specializes in technology shares and other high-growth stocks, and that has listing requirements mandating or allowing 
financial reports in accordance with IAS/IFRS (i.e., Alternative Investment Market in the U.K., Expandi Market in Italy, Neuer Markt in Germany, Nordic Growth 
Market in Sweden, and Sesdaq in Singapore). The Index Member variable represents firms whose shares are constituents of national or international stock market indices 
as defined in Worldscope (field 05661). 
 
 TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables across Voluntary IAS and Local GAAP Reporting Firms 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
Variable Accounting Standard N Mean Std. Dev. P1 P25 Median P75 P99 
Price Impact Local GAAP 65,373 2.644 9.903 0.000 0.028 0.191 1.191 49.404 
 IAS 4,155 1.556 6.582 0.001 0.017 0.099 0.601 26.257 
Bid-Ask Spread Local GAAP 45,593 0.033 0.040 0.002 0.009 0.019 0.039 0.205 
 IAS 3,450 0.019 0.024 0.001 0.006 0.012 0.024 0.105 
Cost of Capital Local GAAP 24,134 11,9% 4,1% 5,5% 9,0% 11,1% 14,0% 25,1% 
 IAS 1,800 12,1% 4,3% 5,7% 8,9% 11,4% 14,2% 25,8% 
 
Panel B: Independent Variables 
Variable Accounting Standard N Mean Std. Dev. P1 P25 Median P75 P99 
Local GAAP 63,949 0.031 0.562 -1.326 -0.349 0.041 0.413 1.255 Reporting Incentives 
IAS 4,127 0.168 0.567 -1.211 -0.203 0.171 0.571 1.330 
Local GAAP 57,124 -1.637 2.562 -13.397 -1.599 -0.809 -0.470 -0.086 Reporting Behavior 
IAS 3,215 -1.632 2.636 -13.441 -1.501 -0.822 -0.515 -0.106 
Local GAAP 65,373 1.009 1.011 0.000 0.000 0.732 1.866 3.144 Reporting Environment 
IAS 4,155 1.083 1.072 0.000 0.000 0.828 2.049 3.198 
Market Value Local GAAP 65,373 582 1,496 4 37 122 410 8,267 
 IAS 4,155 845 1,752 6 72 238 721 9,349 
Share Turnover Local GAAP 65,373 0.559 0.900 0.003 0.114 0.312 0.662 4.449 
 IAS 4,155 0.526 0.910 0.002 0.098 0.267 0.593 4.310 
Return Variability Local GAAP 65,373 0.121 0.080 0.023 0.068 0.099 0.151 0.421 
 IAS 4,155 0.133 0.083 0.021 0.075 0.110 0.168 0.417 
Total Assets Local GAAP 64,852 1,216 3,796 11 64 191 675 19,954 
 IAS 4,116 1,971 4,944 16 120 404 1,400 25,301 
Financial Leverage Local GAAP 64,232 0.508 0.241 0.012 0.340 0.520 0.678 0.964 
 IAS 4,095 0.529 0.236 0.013 0.366 0.548 0.700 0.968 
Forecast Bias Local GAAP 34,912 0.010 0.044 -0.079 -0.004 0.001 0.013 0.213 
 IAS 2,606 0.011 0.045 -0.088 -0.004 0.001 0.015 0.214 
Inflation – 68,273 2.4% 1.9% 0.0% 1.4% 2.1% 3.0% 9.6% 
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The sample comprises a maximum of 69,528 firm-year observations from 30 countries between 1990 and 2005 with financial data from Worldscope and price/volume 
data from Datastream (see Table 1). IAS and Local GAAP represent firm-years with financial reports in accordance with either IAS/IFRS or domestic accounting 
standards, based on our augmented Worldscope accounting standards classification described in the Appendix. The table reports descriptive statistics for the dependent 
variables (Panel A) and the continuous independent variables (Panel B) across IAS and local GAAP firm-year observations. We use three dependent variables in our 
primary analyses: (1) Price Impact is the yearly median of the Amihud [2002] illiquidity measure (i.e., daily absolute stock return divided by US$ trading volume). (2) 
The Bid-Ask Spread is the yearly median quoted spread (i.e., difference between the bid and ask price divided by the mid-point and measured at the end of each trading 
day). (3) Cost of Capital is the average cost of capital estimate implied by the mean I/B/E/S analyst consensus forecasts and stock prices using the valuation models of 
Claus and Thomas [2001], Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan [2001], Easton [2004], and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth [2005]. See the appendix in Hail and Leuz [2006] 
for details on the implied cost of capital estimation procedure. In each of our regression models, we account for firms’ reporting practices with one of the following three 
variables: (1) using factor analysis, we extract a single factor indicating the strength of firms’ reporting incentives from various firm attributes (i.e., market value of 
equity, financial leverage, return on assets, book-to-market ratio, percent of closely-held shares, and percent of foreign sales). We then compute the level of a firm’s 
Reporting Incentives in year t as the rolling average of the raw factor scores over the years t to t-2. Higher values denote greater reporting incentives. (2) We measure 
firms’ actual reporting behavior as the absolute value of accruals scaled by the absolute value of cash flows from operations. We then compute the level of a firm’s 
Reporting Behavior in year t as the rolling average of the raw measures over the years t to t-2. We multiply the metric by -1 so that higher values denote less earnings 
management and more transparent reporting. (3) We measure external pressure from the reporting environment by the number of analysts following the firm. For firms 
without coverage in I/B/E/S we set analyst following to zero. We then compute the level of a firm’s Reporting Environment in year t as the rolling average of the natural 
logs of the annual number of analysts (plus one) over the years t to t-2. Higher values denote more external pressure. The remaining control variables are: Market Value 
is stock price times the number of shares outstanding (in US$ million). Share Turnover is annual US$ trading volume divided by market value of outstanding equity. We 
compute Return Variability as the annual standard deviation of monthly stock returns. Total Assets are denominated in US$ million. Financial Leverage is computed as 
the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Forecast Bias equals the one-year-ahead I/B/E/S analyst forecast error (mean forecast minus actual) scaled by lagged total 
assets. Inflation is the annual median of the one-year-ahead realized monthly percentage changes in a country’s consumer price index as reported in Datastream. 
Accounting data and market values are measured as of the fiscal-year end, the dependent variables, analyst following, forecast bias, return variability and share turnover 
as of month +10 after the end of the fiscal year. Except for variables with natural lower or upper bounds, we truncate all variables at the first and 99th percentile. 
 
 TABLE 3 
Regression Analysis of Liquidity and Cost of Capital around Voluntary IAS Adoptions 





























            
IAS -2.37 -2.45 0.51  3.45* -3.36* 5.02***  0.42*** 0.20 0.33** 
 (-0.83) (-0.81) (0.18)  (1.79) (-1.84) (2.60)  (3.29) (1.30) (2.26) 
            
Reporting VariableLevel -55.96*** -2.53*** -24.62***  -19.68*** -1.38*** -8.90***  -3.26*** -0.13*** -0.43*** 
 (-22.17) (-9.56) (-22.62)  (-12.54) (-9.60) (-12.62)  (-31.94) (-6.80) (-8.33) 
Control Variables:            
U.S. GAAP 5.33 4.58 5.94  -0.71 0.16 2.89  -0.04 -0.40 -0.34 
 (0.90) (0.78) (1.00)  (-0.20) (0.05) (0.82)  (-0.12) (-0.99) (-0.87) 
U.S. Listing -25.97*** -26.68*** -25.29***  -2.61 -6.80*** -1.83  0.18* -0.38*** -0.35*** 
 (-10.24) (-10.55) (-9.95)  (-1.50) (-4.33) (-1.07)  (1.78) (-3.41) (-3.19) 
New Markets 21.81*** 25.54*** 30.53***  12.19*** 14.22*** 15.35***  0.41* 0.55** 0.59** 
 (5.90) (6.64) (8.16)  (5.62) (6.26) (7.04)  (1.86) (2.22) (2.50) 
Index Member -56.46*** -62.08*** -51.98***  -18.49*** -20.06*** -16.68***  -0.73*** -1.25*** -1.11*** 
 (-30.06) (-30.96) (-27.97)  (-14.71) (-16.63) (-13.26)  (-9.24) (-14.20) (-13.20) 
Log(Market Valuet-1) -82.89*** -98.33*** -90.71***  -25.97*** -31.15*** -28.76***  – – – 
 (-93.93) (-176.20) (-138.60)  (-48.50) (-94.50) (-71.39)     
Log(Share Turnovert-1) -66.28*** -66.86*** -63.80***  -21.53*** -20.94*** -20.84***  – – – 
 (-106.96) (-105.60) (-104.09)  (-57.98) (-55.41) (-56.48)     
Log(Return Variabilityt-1) 45.81*** 43.77*** 46.21***  33.21*** 28.31*** 33.55***  – – – 
 (37.24) (33.27) (37.87)  (41.49) (34.74) (42.38)     
Log(Total Assets) – – –  – – –  0.29*** -0.25*** -0.12*** 
         (9.39) (-9.07) (-4.13) 
Financial Leverage – – –  – – –  3.92*** 3.90*** 3.43*** 
         (21.29) (18.88) (17.56) 
Return Variability – – –  – – –  6.25*** 6.53*** 7.11*** 
         (10.05) (9.64) (11.21) 
Forecast Bias – – –  – – –  19.68*** 17.98*** 18.57*** 
         (19.38) (17.14) (18.62) 
Inflation – – –  – – –  28.06*** 24.80*** 26.55*** 
         (13.19) (10.46) (12.03) 
Country-, Year-, and  
Industry-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 81.4% 81.9% 81.4%  73.1% 75.9% 73.3%  35.9% 30.6% 30.4% 
# Observations 68,076 60,339 69,528  47,985 42,652 49,043  25,260 23,689 25,934 
# Unique Firms 12,024 10,938 12,171  9,722 8,825 9,838  5,881 5,439 6,051 
# Countries 30 30 30  24 24 24  29 29 29 
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The sample comprises firm-year observations from up to 30 countries with voluntary IAS adoptions between 1990 and 2005 (see Table 1). The table reports OLS 
coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. We use Price Impact, Bid-Ask Spread, and Cost of 
Capital as the dependent variables. IAS represents firm-years with financial reports in accordance with IAS/IFRS, based on our augmented Worldscope accounting 
standards classification described in the Appendix. In each regression, we include one of the following three Reporting Variables (computed in year t): (1) the strength of 
firms’ Reporting Incentives; (2) firms’ actual Reporting Behavior; (3) the external pressure from firms’ Reporting Environment. For variable details see Tables 1 and 2. 
We use the natural log of the raw values and lag the variables by one year where indicated. We include country-, year-, and industry-fixed effects (based on the 
classification in Campbell [1996]) in the regressions, but do not report the coefficients. For expositional purposes we multiply all coefficients by 100. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
 TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Serious and Label Voluntary IAS Adoptions 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the Reporting Variables Used to Partition the Voluntary IAS Firms into Serious and Label Adopters 
Variables  N Mean Std. Dev. P1 Median P99 
Split by Changes in Reporting Incentives:       
Label Adopters Pre-Adoption Level 270 0.330 0.501 -1.018 0.356 1.314 
 ! around Adoption 270 -0.264 0.331 -1.582 -0.175 0.037 
Serious Adopters Pre-Adoption Level 257 0.118 0.573 -1.198 0.094 1.256 
 ! around Adoption 257 0.359 0.293 0.047 0.277 1.410 
Total Pre-Adoption Level 527 0.227 0.547 -1.163 0.220 1.276 
 ! around Adoption 527 0.040 0.441 -1.333 0.039 1.285 
Split by Changes in Reporting Behavior:       
Label Adopters Pre-Adoption Level 241 -0.786 0.677 -3.903 -0.661 -0.042 
 ! around Adoption 241 -1.638 3.703 -19.852 -0.459 -0.004 
Serious Adopters Pre-Adoption Level 229 -2.240 3.139 -15.395 -0.972 -0.197 
 ! around Adoption 229 1.523 2.922 0.020 0.302 14.421 
Total Pre-Adoption Level 470 -1.494 2.356 -14.654 -0.763 -0.097 
 ! around Adoption 470 -0.098 3.697 -16.629 -0.003 13.587 
Split by Changes in Reporting Environment:       
Label Adopters Pre-Adoption Level 249 1.637 0.920 0.231 1.609 3.219 
 ! around Adoption 249 -0.648 0.524 -2.193 -0.475 -0.024 
Serious Adopters Pre-Adoption Level 338 0.594 0.909 0.000 0.000 3.119 
 ! around Adoption 338 0.429 0.635 0.000 0.086 2.556 
Total Pre-Adoption Level 587 1.037 1.049 0.000 0.693 3.178 
 ! around Adoption 587 -0.028 0.795 -2.042 0.000 2.533 
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Panel B: Distribution of Serious and Label Voluntary IAS Adopters by Country 
(Number of 
Unique Firms) 
Split by Changes in  
Reporting Incentives  
Split by Changes in  
Reporting Behavior  
Split by Changes in  
Reporting Environment 
Country Label Serious Total  Label Serious Total  Label Serious Total 
Australia 2 2 4  0 3 3  2 2 4 
Austria 22 16 38  17 14 31  18 25 43 
Belgium 5 7 12  4 9 13  8 5 13 
Bermuda 0 2 2  0 1 1  0 2 2 
Canada 0 0 0  1 0 1  0 1 1 
China 21 20 41  3 4 7  4 40 44 
Czech Republic 1 0 1  1 0 1  1 0 1 
Denmark 9 7 16  11 5 16  9 9 18 
Finland 2 3 5  2 4 6  5 3 8 
France 7 19 26  7 21 28  11 18 29 
Germany 80 60 140  83 66 149  67 97 164 
Greece 4 1 5  2 2 4  3 3 6 
Hong Kong 2 1 3  1 3 4  2 3 5 
Hungary 2 2 4  3 2 5  3 3 6 
Israel 0 1 1  1 0 1  0 1 1 
Italy 15 19 34  19 10 29  14 20 34 
Luxembourg 2 1 3  3 0 3  0 3 3 
The Netherlands 0 4 4  2 1 3  0 5 5 
Norway 1 0 1  1 0 1  1 0 1 
Pakistan 4 4 8  2 5 7  3 5 8 
Peru 12 2 14  8 1 9  6 8 14 
Poland 2 0 2  2 1 3  3 1 4 
Portugal 1 3 4  1 2 3  1 3 4 
Russian Federation 1 3 4  0 3 3  1 4 5 
South Africa 7 8 15  7 8 15  6 10 16 
Sweden 0 2 2  2 2 4  1 2 3 
Switzerland 36 43 79  29 38 67  33 48 81 
Turkey 32 27 59  29 24 53  47 17 64 
Total 270 257 527  241 229 470  249 338 587 
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Panel C: Distribution of Serious and Label Voluntary IAS Adopters by Year 
(Number of 
Unique Firms) 
Split by Changes in  
Reporting Incentives  
Split by Changes in  
Reporting Behavior  
Split by Changes in  
Reporting Environment 
Year Label Serious Total  Label Serious Total  Label Serious Total 
1990 1 7 8  3 5 8  1 6 7 
1991 3 2 5  2 2 4  0 5 5 
1992 5 13 18  3 13 16  4 18 22 
1993 4 11 15  3 9 12  1 14 15 
1994 5 9 14  6 7 13  5 7 12 
1995 10 4 14  2 9 11  2 10 12 
1996 6 9 15  2 6 8  7 8 15 
1997 13 13 26  9 7 16  10 20 30 
1998 20 11 31  19 10 29  16 21 37 
1999 41 23 64  38 21 59  34 43 77 
2000 45 20 65  39 21 60  38 41 79 
2001 33 14 47  26 16 42  29 24 53 
2002 41 26 67  33 30 63  27 44 71 
2003 32 42 74  31 33 64  46 36 82 
2004 11 53 64   25 40 65   29 41 70 
Total 270 257 527  241 229 470  249 338 587 
% of Total in 
pre-1998 Period 17.4% 26.5%   12.4% 25.3%   12.0% 26.0%  
% of Total in  
post-1997 Period 82.6% 73.5%   87.6% 74.7%   88.0% 74.0%  
 
The sample comprises firm-year observations from up to 30 countries with voluntary IAS adoptions between 1990 and 2005 (see Table 1). The table reports descriptive 
statistics for the three reporting variables used to partition the voluntary IAS adopting firms into serious and label adopters (Panel A), and the number of unique (serious 
and label) IAS adopters by country (Panel B) and year (Panel C). In Panel A, we report descriptive statistics for the following three variables: (1) the strength of firms’ 
Reporting Incentives measured as the rolling three-year average of the raw scores from a single factor extracted from various firm attributes. (2) Firms’ actual Reporting 
Behavior measured as the rolling three-year average of the absolute value of accruals scaled by the absolute value of cash flows from operations. (3) The external 
pressure from firms’ Reporting Environment measured as the rolling three-year average of the natural log of the number of analysts following the firm (plus one). The 
pre-adoption level is equal to the respective reporting variable in the year before the switch to IAS (i.e., year t-1 relative to year t of IAS adoption). The change (!) 
around adoption is the difference between year t+3 after adoption and year t-1 before adoption. We then partition the IAS adopting firms based on the distribution of 
these changes into Serious Adopters (change is greater than or equal to the median) and Label Adopters. Each voluntary IAS adopter enters this computation only once. 
Note that due to additional data restrictions the number of unique voluntary IAS firms is lower in the later regression analyses. 
 TABLE 5 
Univariate Analysis of Liquidity and Cost of Capital around Serious and Label Voluntary IAS Adoptions 
Split by Changes in  
Reporting Incentives 
 Split by Changes in  
Reporting Behavior 
 Split by Changes in  
Reporting Environment 
(Median Values  

























(2) – (1) 
Panel A: Price Impact            
0.111 0.046 -0.065***  0.107 0.057 -0.050***!  0.090 0.085 -0.005 IAS  
(a) 1,060 880   874 754   889! 1,262!  
0.185   0.191 ! ! 0.191  Local GAAP  
(b) 63,812   57,111   65,259  
Difference (a) – (b) -0.074*** -0.139***   -0.084*** -0.134***   -0.101*** -0.106*** !
            
Panel B: Bid-Ask Spread            
0.012 0.008 -0.004***  0.012 0.010 -0.002***  0.011 0.010 -0.001*** IAS  
(a) 877 717!   762 653   771 989  
0.019   0.019   0.019  Local GAAP  
(b) 44,461   39,857   45,517  
Difference (a) – (b) -0.007*** -0.011***   -0.007*** -0.009***   -0.008*** -0.009***  
            
Panel C: Cost of Capital           !
12.0% 10.7% -1.3%***  11.4%! 11.0%! -0.4%!  10.8% 11.6% 0.8%** IAS  
(a) 393 437!   394 440 ! ! 330 576!  
11.1%   11.0%   11.1%  Local GAAP  
(b)! 23,423   22,080   24,078  
Difference (a) – (b) 0.9%***! -0.4%**!   0.4% 0.0%   -0.3%! 0.5%*!  
 
The sample comprises firm-year observations from up to 30 countries with voluntary IAS adoptions between 1990 and 2005 (see Table 1). The table reports median 
values and the number of observations across firms reporting under local GAAP, serious and label IAS adopters. We use Price Impact, Bid-Ask Spread, and Cost of 
Capital as capital-market variables in the analyses (see Table 2). IAS and Local GAAP represent firm-years with financial reports in accordance with either IAS/IFRS or 
domestic accounting standards, based on our augmented Worldscope accounting standards classification described in the Appendix. We classify each IAS adopting firm 
as either Serious Adopter or Label Adopter based on the distribution of the changes in the three reporting variables around IAS adoption (see Table 4 for details). We 
limit the IAS observations to the initial five years after the adoption. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of median differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
(two-tailed), based on a Wilcoxon rank sum test. 
 TABLE 6 
Regression Analysis of Liquidity and Cost of Capital around Serious and Label Voluntary IAS Adoptions 





























            
IAS 16.95*** 6.28 18.42***  6.17** -0.69 5.40**  1.34*** 0.87*** 0.46* 
 (3.51) (1.25) (3.55)  (2.19) (-0.25) (1.98)  (5.21) (2.86) (1.67) 
Serious Adopters -48.38*** -19.28*** -37.77***  -18.33*** -7.98** -12.53***  -1.78*** -0.68** -0.12 
 (-7.04) (-2.85) (-5.78)  (-4.48) (-2.07) (-3.27)  (-5.59) (-1.99) (-0.34) 
IAS + Serious = 0 [p-value] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00] [0.02]  [0.04] [0.33] [0.14] 
            
Control Variables:            
Reporting VariableLevel -56.48*** -2.57*** -24.73***  -18.77*** -1.48*** -8.81***  -3.15*** -0.13*** -0.42*** 
 (-22.47) (-9.49) (-22.47)  (-11.86) (-10.04) (-12.28)  (-29.48) (-6.45) (-8.10) 
U.S. GAAP 5.81 5.13 6.93  -4.39 -0.43 -0.04  -0.02 -0.36 -0.25 
 (0.96) (0.86) (1.15)  (-1.18) (-0.12) (-0.01)  (-0.05) (-0.88) (-0.64) 
U.S. Listing -24.96*** -26.20*** -24.54***  -3.51** -6.61*** -2.87*  0.17 -0.37*** -0.34*** 
 (-9.58) (-10.16) (-9.40)  (-2.03) (-4.15) (-1.68)  (1.63) (-3.23) (-3.05) 
New Markets 19.43*** 23.19*** 28.57***  13.79*** 13.37*** 16.15***  0.48* 0.51* 0.53** 
 (4.85) (5.74) (7.35)  (5.69) (5.41) (6.95)  (1.87) (1.90) (2.03) 
Index Member -56.76*** -62.54*** -52.27***  -18.73*** -20.02*** -16.95***  -0.76*** -1.27*** -1.12*** 
 (-29.79) (-30.69) (-27.81)  (-14.85) (-16.28) (-13.27)  (-9.38) (-14.22) (-13.19) 
Log(Market Valuet-1) -83.01*** -98.36*** -90.81***  -26.16*** -31.18*** -28.70***  – – – 
 (-94.29) (-172.69) (-137.04)  (-49.00) (-92.62) (-70.19)     
Log(Share Turnovert-1) -65.84*** -66.55*** -63.47***  -21.17*** -20.76*** -20.45***  – – – 
 (-103.67) (-102.98) (-101.41)  (-57.47) (-54.37) (-54.09)     
Log(Return Variabilityt-1) 45.61*** 43.70*** 46.05***  33.06*** 28.38*** 33.34***  – – – 
 (36.35) (32.33) (37.01)  (40.22) (34.59) (40.71)     
Log(Total Assets) – – –  – – –  0.27*** -0.26*** -0.13*** 
         (8.45) (-8.99) (-4.30) 
Financial Leverage – – –  – – –  3.95*** 3.88*** 3.44*** 
         (20.88) (18.46) (17.28) 
Return Variability – – –  – – –  6.28*** 6.52*** 7.00*** 
         (9.72) (9.38) (10.71) 
Forecast Bias – – –  – – –  19.23*** 17.58*** 18.31*** 
         (18.33) (16.32) (17.92) 
Inflation – – –  – – –  26.58*** 23.51*** 25.84*** 
         (11.93) (9.71) (11.37) 
Country-, Year-, and  
Industry-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 81.6% 81.9% 81.5%  73.5% 76.1% 73.6%  35.6% 30.6% 30.5% 
# Observations 65,752 58,739 67,390  46,055 41,272 47,277  24,253 22,914 24,984 
# Serious/Label Observations 880/1,060 754/874 1,262/889  717/877 653/762 989/771  437/393 440/394 576/330 
# Unique Firms 11,544 10,578 11,753  9,287 8,500 9,460  5,574 5,205 5,764 
# Countries 30 30 30  24 24 24  29 29 29 
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The sample comprises firm-year observations from up to 30 countries with voluntary IAS adoptions between 1990 and 2005 (see Table 1). The table reports OLS 
coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. It also reports p-values [in brackets] from an F-test 
indicating joint statistical significance of the coefficients on IAS and Serious Adopters. We use Price Impact, Bid-Ask Spread, and Cost of Capital as the dependent 
variables. IAS represents firm-years with financial reports in accordance with IAS/IFRS, based on our augmented Worldscope accounting standards classification 
described in the Appendix. In each regression, we include one of the following three Reporting Variables (computed in year t, except for IAS adopting firms, for which 
we use the mean of the respective metric in the years before IAS adoption): (1) the strength of firms’ Reporting Incentives; (2) firms’ actual Reporting Behavior; (3) the 
external pressure from firms’ Reporting Environment. We further classify each IAS adopting firm as either serious (i.e., Serious Adopters variable set equal to ‘1’) or 
label adopter (i.e., Serious Adopters variable set equal to ‘0’) based on the distribution of the changes (!) in the three reporting variables around IAS adoption (see Table 
4 for details). We limit the IAS observations to the initial five years after the adoption. For variable details see Tables 1 and 2. We use the natural log of the raw values 
and lag the variables by one year where indicated. We include country-, year-, and industry-fixed effects (based on the classification in Campbell [1996]) in the 
regressions, but do not report the coefficients. For expositional purposes we multiply all coefficients by 100. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
 TABLE 7 
Sensitivity Analyses: Heterogeneity in the Accounting Standards and Mandatory IFRS Adoption 
Panel A: Capital Market Effects around Serious and Label Voluntary IAS Adoptions for Strict IAS Definition After 1998 (Requiring Auditor Attestation) 





























            
IAS 19.05*** 8.17 14.40**  12.90*** 4.77 10.27***  1.45*** 1.23*** 0.71** 
 (3.14) (1.31) (2.25)  (3.53) (1.42) (3.03)  (4.62) (3.24) (2.21) 
Serious Adopters -48.04*** -18.69** -36.18***  -23.79*** -10.88** -16.73***  -1.93*** -1.54*** -0.51 
 (-5.23) (-2.17) (-4.45)  (-4.59) (-2.32) (-3.45)  (-4.50) (-3.40) (-1.09) 
IAS + Serious = 0 [p-value] [0.00] [0.12] [0.00]  [0.01] [0.10] [0.10]  [0.14] [0.29] [0.57] 
            
Control Variables, Country-, Year-, 
and Industry-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 81.1% 81.5% 81.1%  76.2% 78.8% 76.4%  42.4% 37.8% 37.3% 
# Observations 32,102 29,794 32,823  24,204 22,474 24,758  8,117 7,910 8,453 
# Serious/Label Observations 444/570 402/517 558/576  383/532 387/484 493/536  158/214 192/193 227/196 
# Unique Firms 7,654 7,126 7,793  6,074 5,657 6,190  2,605 2,456 2,696 
# Countries 25 25 25  20 20 20  23 23 23 
 
Panel B: Capital Market Effects around Serious and Label Mandatory IFRS Adoptions 





























            
IFRS 39.95*** 20.39*** 37.16***  13.90*** 8.78*** 9.41***  0.25 0.05 0.20 
 (10.64) (5.20) (8.38)  (7.09) (4.59) (4.05)  (1.57) (0.30) (1.05) 
Serious Adopters -67.53*** -19.44*** -38.43***  -25.83*** -12.65*** -10.63***  -1.11*** -0.19 -0.43** 
 (-14.84) (-4.09) (-7.94)  (-10.48) (-5.06) (-4.05)  (-5.81) (-0.95) (-2.17) 
IFRS + Serious = 0 [p-value] [0.00] [0.80] [0.69]  [0.00] [0.05] [0.45]  [0.00] [0.41] [0.10] 
            
Control Variables, Country-, Year-, 
and Industry-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 85.6% 85.7% 85.9%  77.2% 78.1% 77.6%  36.5% 33.9% 33.4% 
# Observations 22,421 21,375 23,964  21,709 20,726 23,280  6,897 6,960 7,260 
# Serious/Label Observations 1,551/1,516 1,540/1,551 2,443/983  1,493/1,465 1,495/1,499 2,384/934  510/502 555/467 647/423 
# Unique Firms 6,825 6,491 7,252  6,590 6,258 7,012  2,806 2,801 2,940 
# Countries 26 26 26  23 23 23  23 23 23 
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The sample comprises firm-year observations from up to 25 countries with voluntary IAS adoptions between 1998 and 2005 in Panel A, and from up to 26 countries 
with mandatory IFRS adoption by the end of 2005 (covering the years 2002 to 2005) in Panel B. The table reports only the OLS coefficients (t-statistics, clustered by 
firm) of the IAS and Serious Adopters (IFRS and Serious Adopters) variables, but the full set of controls and fixed effects is included. It also reports p-values [in 
brackets] from an F-test indicating joint statistical significance of the two variables. We use Price Impact, Bid-Ask Spread, and Cost of Capital as the dependent 
variables. In Panel A, IAS represents firm-years with financial reports in accordance with IAS/IFRS, based on our augmented Worldscope accounting standards 
classification described in the Appendix. In addition, we require the following two criteria to ensure proper IAS/IFRS reporting by the treatment firms: (1) we limit the 
sample to firm-years from 1998 onward, i.e., the year the IASC completed a major revision of all its core standards, and (2) we only include IAS adopting firms for 
which compliance with IAS/IFRS reporting in the three years following the switch is attested by the auditor in the audit opinion footnote (based on our manual 
inspection of the firm’s financial reports). In Panel B, IFRS represents firm-years ending on or after the local date for mandated IFRS reporting (see Daske et al. [2008]), 
and applies only to firms that never reported under IAS/IFRS before (i.e., we exclude voluntary IAS adopter firms). We use the same three Reporting Variables as 
controls and to partition the mandatory IFRS adopting firms into serious and label adopters as in the voluntary IAS analyses. For details on the regression specification 
and the serious versus label classification see Table 6. For variable details see Tables 1 and 2. For expositional purposes we multiply all coefficients by 100. ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
 
 TABLE 8 
Additional Sensitivity Analyses for the Capital Market Effects around Serious and Label Voluntary IAS Adoptions 
Variables 
Split by  
! Reporting 
Incentives 
 Split by  
! Reporting 
Behavior 
 Split by  
! Reporting 
Environment 
Panel A: Alternative Dependent Variables      
(1) Log(Total Trading Costs)      
IAS -9.11***  -4.82  -6.49* 
 (-2.93)  (-1.62)  (-1.77) 
Serious Adopters -7.80*  -7.57*  -10.60**!
 (-1.87)  (-1.72)  (-2.48) 
IAS + Serious = 0 [p-value] [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00] 
      
(2) Zero Returns      
IAS -2.49***  -2.16***  -1.57**!
 (-4.05)  (-3.26)  (-2.15) 
Serious Adopters -0.22  -1.19  -2.03** 
 (-0.25)  (-1.31)  (-2.32) 
IAS + Serious = 0 [p-value] [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00] 
      
(3) Tobin’s q      
IAS -36.02***  -5.94  -17.24*** 
 (-12.12)  (-1.34)  (-3.99) 
Serious Adopters 57.17***  10.12  20.73*** 
 (11.64)  (1.55)  (3.34) 
IAS + Serious = 0 [p-value] [0.00]  [0.43]  [0.47] 
      
Panel B: Alternative Accounting Standards Classifications (Price Impact as Dependent Variable) 
(4) Voluntary IAS and U.S. GAAP Adoption Combined     
IAS/U.S. GAAP 16.31***  5.45  20.51***!
 (3.53)  (1.10)  (4.11) 
Serious Adopters -48.19***  -18.76***  -39.72*** 
 (-7.42)  (-2.95)  (-6.45)!
IAS/U.S. GAAP + Serious = 0 [p-value] [0.00]  [0.01]  [0.00] 
      
(5) Voluntary U.S. GAAP Adoption      
U.S. GAAP 11.03  -6.07  18.02 
 (0.83)  (-0.39)  (1.31) 
Serious Adopters -56.48***  -16.90  -42.14** 
 (-2.97)  (-0.94)  (-2.56)!
U.S. GAAP + Serious = 0 [p-value] [0.00]  [0.05]  [0.04] 
      
Panel C: Alternative Sample Compositions (Price Impact as Dependent Variable) 
(6) Exclude Firms from the U.K. and Canada      
IAS 13.54***  1.17  14.82*** 
 (2.79)  (0.23)  (2.79) 
Serious Adopters -46.64***  -16.19**  -38.22*** 
 (-6.77)  (-2.38)  (-5.74) 
IAS + Serious = 0 [p-value] [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00] 
      
(7) IAS Firms only      
IAS 4.63  -4.91  2.70 
 (0.82)  (-0.87)  (0.46) 
Serious Adopters -44.69***  -11.70*  -28.94*** 
 (-6.62)  (-1.83)  (-4.40) 
IAS + Serious = 0 [p-value] [0.00]  [0.01]  [0.00]!
      
Panel D: Alternative Model Specifications (Price Impact as Dependent Variable) 
(8) Firm-Fixed Effects instead of Country- and Industry-Fixed Effects 
IAS 20.19**  -1.98  -2.79 
 (2.41)  (-0.24)  (-0.29) 
Serious Adopters -82.36***  -24.08*  -20.75 
 (-6.71)  (-1.84)  (-1.62) 
IAS + Serious = 0 [p-value] [0.00]  [0.01]  [0.00] 
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 TABLE 8—Continued 
The sample comprises firm-year observations from up to 30 countries with voluntary IAS adoptions between 1990 and 2005 
(see Table 1). The table reports only the OLS coefficients (t-statistics, clustered by firm) of the IAS and Serious Adopters 
(U.S. GAAP and Serious Adopters) variables, but the full set of controls and fixed effects is included (see Table 6). It also 
reports p-values [in brackets] from an F-test indicating joint statistical significance of the two variables. We show results for 
the serious and label adopters using each of the three Reporting Variables to partition the IAS (U.S. GAAP) observations. In 
Panel A, we examine the following alternative dependent variables: Total Trading Costs is a yearly estimate of total round-
trip transaction costs (i.e., bid-ask spreads, commissions, and implicit costs such as short-sale constraints or taxes) inferred 
from the time-series of daily security and aggregate market returns (see Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka [1999]). Zero 
Returns is the proportion of trading days with zero daily stock returns out of all potential trading days in a given year. 
Tobin’s q equals (total assets – book value of equity + market value of equity)/total assets. The total trading costs and zero 
returns specifications are the same as for price impact. For Tobin’s q we use the log of total assets, financial leverage, asset 
growth (computed as the one-year percentage change in total assets), and industry q (equal to the yearly median q in a given 
industry) as continuous control variables. In the remaining panels, we use Price Impact as the dependent variable. In Panel 
B, we report results for two alternative accounting standards classifications. First, we create a combined IAS and U.S. 
GAAP variable (based on our augmented Worldscope accounting standards classification), and split the firms that switch 
from local GAAP to either IAS or U.S. GAAP into serious and label adopters. Second, we focus on the voluntary U.S. 
GAAP adopters and partition them into serious and label adopters (while controlling for IAS reporting in the regression). In 
Panel C, we report results for alternative sample compositions. First, we exclude firms from the U.K. and Canada from the 
sample. Second, we limit the analysis to firms that at some point during the sample period reported under IAS. In Panel D, 
we replace the country- and industry-fixed effects with firm-fixed effects. For expositional purposes we multiply all 
coefficients by 100. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
 TABLE A1 
Accounting Standards Classifications Based on Different Data Sources 
Panel A: Coding Based on Worldscope (WS) “Accounting Standards Followed” (Field 07536) 
WS Code WS Description 
Coding  
for Analyses 
We code firm-year observations as IAS if one of the following cases applies: IAS 
02 International standards  
06 International standards and some EU guidelines  
08 Local standards with EU and IASC guidelines  
12 International standards – inconsistency problems  
16 International standards and some EU guidelines – inconsistency problems  
18 Local standards with some IASC guidelines  
19 Local standards with OECD and IASC guidelines  
23 IFRS  
We code firm-year observations as U.S. GAAP if one of the following cases applies: U.S. GAAP 
03 U.S. standards (GAAP)  
13 US standards – inconsistency problems  
20 US GAAP reclassified from local standards  
We code firm-year observations as local if one of the following cases applies: Local 
01 Local standards  
05 EU standards  
07 Specific standards set by the group  
09 Not disclosed  
10 Local standards with some EU guidelines  
11 Local standards – inconsistency problems  
14 Commonwealth standards – inconsistency problems  
15 EEC standards – inconsistency problems  
17 Local standards with some OECD guidelines  
21 Local standards with a certain reclassification for foreign companies  
22 Other  
 
Panel B: Coding Based on Global Vantage (GV) “Accounting Standard” (Field ASTD) 
GV Code GV Description 
Coding  
for Analyses 
We code firm-year observations as IAS if one of the following cases applies: IAS 
DA Domestic standards generally in accordance with IASC and OECD guidelines  
DI Domestic standards generally in accordance with IASC guidelines  
DT Domestic standards in accordance with principles generally accepted in the United 
States and generally in accordance with IASC and OECD guidelines 
 
We code firm-year observations as U.S. GAAP if one of the following cases applies: U.S. GAAP 
DU Domestic standards in accordance with principles generally accepted in the U.S.  
MU Modified United States’ standards (Japanese companies’ financial statements 
translated into English) 
 
US United States’ standards  
We code firm-year observations as local if one of the following cases applies: Local 
DD Domestic standards for parents and domestic subsidiaries. Native country or United 
States’ standards for overseas subsidiaries 
 
DO Domestic standards generally in accordance with OECD guidelines  
DR Accounts reclassified to show allowance for doubtful accounts and/or accumulated 
depreciation as a reduction of assets rather than liabilities 
 
DS Domestic standards  
MI Accounts reclassified by SPCS to combine separate life insurance and non-life 
insurance accounts 
 
LJ Combination DR and MI   
(Continued) 
 TABLE A1—Continued 




We code firm-year observations as IAS if one of the following cases applies: 
(1) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to IAS/IFRS only 
(2) Annual report has two separate sections with two full sets of consolidated financial statements 
(balance sheet, income statement, statement of cash flows), one set under local GAAP, and one 
set under IAS/IFRS (Parallel Reporting) 
(3) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to IAS/IFRS in the first place, but also refer to 
compliance with local GAAP 
(4) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to local GAAP in the first place, but also refer 
to compliance with IAS/IFRS 
(5) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to full compliance with local GAAP, but also 
to application of IAS/IFRS if local GAAP is silent about a reporting issue (Dual Reporting) 
(6) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to full application local GAAP, but there is also 
a reconciliation of net income and/or shareholders’ equity to IAS/IFRS in a separate section of 
the annual report (Reconciliation) 
IAS 
We code firm-year observations as U.S. GAAP if one of the following cases applies: 
(1) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to U.S. GAAP only 
(2) Annual report has two separate sections with two full sets of consolidated financial statements 
(balance sheet, income statement, statement of cash flows), one set under local GAAP, and one 
set under U.S. GAAP (Parallel Reporting) 
(3) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to U.S. GAAP in the first place, but also refer 
to compliance with local GAAP 
(4) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to local GAAP in the first place, but also refer 
to compliance with U.S. GAAP 
(5) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to full compliance with local GAAP, but also 
to application of U.S. GAAP if local GAAP is silent about a reporting issue (Dual Reporting) 
(6) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to full application local GAAP, but there is also 
a reconciliation of net income and/or shareholders’ equity to U.S. GAAP in a separate section 
of the annual report (Reconciliation) 
U.S. GAAP 
We code firm-year observations as local if one of the following cases applies: 
(1) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to local GAAP only 
(2) Notes to consolidated financial statements refer to local GAAP only, but selected individual 
IAS/IFRS or U.S. GAAP standards are applied on specific reporting issues (e.g. Leasing IAS 
17, Segment Reporting SFAS 131) 
Local 
 
The table describes the assignment of firm-year observations to the reporting categories IAS, U.S. GAAP or Local GAAP 
using three different accounting standards classifications. The first two are based on Worldscope (Panel A) and Global 
Vantage (Panel B), as retrieved in May 2006. The third classification is hand-coded and based on firms’ annual reports 
collected through Thomson Research (Panel C). In our main analyses, we use an augmented classification that combines 
information from all three classifications. 
 TABLE A2 
Comparison of Accounting Standards Classifications by Data Source (For Sample Used in Main Analyses) 
Panel A: Worldscope versus Global Vantage Classifications 
  Comprehensive Coding for IAS  Stricter Coding for IAS 




GAAP Local Total  IAS 
U.S. 
GAAP Local Total 
IAS  2,001 7 844 2,852  1,800 7 921 2,728 
  2.9% 0.0% 1.2% 4.1%  2.6% 0.0% 1.3% 3.9% 
U.S. GAAP  26 606 178 810  1 481 78 560 
  0.0% 0.7% 0.5% 1.2%  0.0% 0.7% 0.1% 0.8% 
Local  1,658 218 45,273 47,149  737 332 46,454 47,523 
  2.4% 0.5% 64.9% 67.8%  1.1% 0.5% 66.8% 68.4% 
Not covered  662 252 17,803 18,717  447 252 18,018 18,717 
  0.9% 0.4% 25.6% 26.9%  0.6% 0.4% 25.9% 26.9% 
Total  4,347 1,083 64,098 69,528  2,985 1,072 65,471 69,528 
   6.3% 1.6% 92.2% 100.0%   4.3% 1.5% 94.2% 100.0% 
 
Panel B: Hand-Coded Classification versus Worldscope and Global Vantage Classifications 
  Worldscope Classification  Global Vantage Classification 
Hand-coded 









IAS  2,912 66 725 n.a. 3,703  2,150 6 1,009 538 3,703 
  4.2% 0.1% 1.0%  5.3%  3.1% 0.0% 1.5% 0.8% 5.3% 
U.S. GAAP  45 787 377 n.a. 1,209  20 537 406 246 1,209 
  0.1% 1.1% 0.5%  1.7%  0.0% 0.8% 0.6% 0.4% 1.7% 
Local  923 66 3,288 n.a. 4,277  399 69 2,981 828 4,277 
  1.3% 0.1% 4.7%  6.2%  0.6% 0.1% 4.3% 1.2% 6.2% 
 467 223 59,649 n.a. 60,339  283 198 42,753 17,105 60,339 No annual 
report data  0.7% 0.3% 85.8%  86.8%  0.4% 0.3% 61.5% 24.6% 86.8% 
Total  4,347 1,083 64,098 n.a. 69,528  2,852 810 47,149 18,717 69,528 
  6.3% 1.6% 92.2%   100.0%  4.1% 1.2% 67.8% 26.9% 100.0% 
 






Hand-coded Classification 0.609 0.605 
   p-values (0.00) (0.00) 
   N 9,176 7,570 
Worldscope Classification  0.593 
   p-values  (0.00) 
   N  50,775 
 
The table presents the number of observations and percentages across different accounting standards classifications for our 
base sample comprising 69,528 firm-year observations from 30 countries between 1990 and 2005 (see Table 1). In Panel A, 
we compare IAS, U.S. GAAP, or local GAAP firm-years based on the accounting standards classification in Worldscope 
and Global Vantage. The left-hand side of the panel applies the coding scheme as outlined in Table A1. On the right-hand 
side we use a stricter coding for IAS observations consisting of Worldscope categories 02 (“International standards”) and 23 
(“IFRS”) together with Global Vantage category DI (“Domestic standards generally in accordance with IASC guidelines”). 
In Panel B, we compare our own classification based on an extensive manual review of firms’ annual reports (see Table A1, 
Panel C) with the coding based on Worldscope and Global Vantage. Panel C reports the respective Pearson correlations 
across the three data sources. 
 
 TABLE A3 
Comparison of Accounting Standards Classifications by Country 
  
Worldscope  
Classification   
Global Vantage  
Classification   
Hand-Coded Classification  
plus Local GAAP Firms 
  IAS  U.S. GAAP   IAS  U.S. GAAP   IAS  U.S. GAAP 
Country n n %   n %  n n %   n %  n n %   n % 
Argentina 899 3 0.3  10 1.1  361 0 0.0  6 1.7  337 3 0.9  7 2.1 
Australia 12,371 142 1.1  22 0.2  4,917 17 0.3  8 0.2  4,044 134 3.3  23 0.6 
Austria 2,027 332 16.4  44 2.2  1,183 282 23.8  38 3.2  1,245 343 27.6  43 3.5 
Belgium 3,022 187 6.2  39 1.3  1,636 135 8.3  48 2.9  1,341 179 13.3  55 4.1 
Bermuda 315 50 15.9  120 38.1  4,422 268 6.1  86 1.9  220 51 23.2  105 47.7 
Brazil 3,673 2 0.1  6 0.2  1,698 0 0.0  2 0.1  1,374 1 0.1  1 0.1 
Canada 17,502 87 0.5  418 2.4  9,641 13 0.1  24 0.2  7,669 40 0.5  529 6.9 
Chile 2,063 1 0.0  2 0.1  1,106 0 0.0  1 0.1  998 0 0.0  0 0.0 
China 10,598 1,144 10.8  108 1.0  14,066 224 1.6  4 0.0  8,515 1,157 13.6  54 0.6 
Colombia 527 0 0.0  0 0.0  265 0 0.0  0 0.0  197 0 0.0  0 0.0 
Czech Republic 470 90 19.1  0 0.0  194 73 37.6  0 0.0  206 68 33.0  0 0.0 
Denmark 3,854 141 3.7  14 0.4  2,086 118 5.7  0 0.0  1,853 155 8.4  23 1.2 
Egypt 145 2 1.4  0 0.0  0 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0 0.0  0 0.0 
Finland 2,697 70 2.6  0 0.0  1,359 95 7.0  3 0.2  1,298 79 6.1  8 0.6 
France 15,533 961 6.2  182 1.2  8,100 591 7.3  200 2.5  5,528 347 6.3  197 3.6 
Germany 15,744 1,685 10.7  714 4.5  8,212 1,632 19.9  841 10.2  7,681 1,723 22.4  679 8.8 
Greece 3,133 43 1.4  29 0.9  742 38 5.1  16 2.2  629 41 6.5  23 3.7 
Hong Kong 8,855 200 2.3  59 0.7  2,374 13 0.5  2 0.1  5,793 163 2.8  33 0.6 
Hungary 380 192 50.5  7 1.8  182 132 72.5  8 4.4  225 154 68.4  0 0.0 
India 4,547 8 0.2  17 0.4  2,644 4 0.2  6 0.2  2,010 0 0.0  18 0.9 
Indonesia 3,268 1 0.0  0 0.0  2,541 0 0.0  7 0.3  2,204 0 0.0  7 0.3 
Ireland 1,498 40 2.7  30 2.0  784 1 0.1  6 0.8  660 0 0.0  27 4.1 
Israel 1,264 45 3.6  361 28.6  646 21 3.3  112 17.3  786 49 6.2  411 52.3 
Italy 5,544 4,364 78.7  8 0.1  2,944 6 0.2  18 0.6  3,236 813 25.1  34 1.1 
Japan 56,817 133 0.2  944 1.7  45,184 5 0.0  348 0.8  36,667 0 0.0  637 1.7 
Korea (South) 8,566 10 0.1  5 0.1  2,146 0 0.0  2 0.1  1,987 0 0.0  5 0.3 
Luxembourg 484 99 20.5  50 10.3  305 93 30.5  39 12.8  191 107 56.0  25 13.1 
Malaysia 9,123 24 0.3  0 0.0  8,167 34 0.4  0 0.0  6,718 2 0.0  0 0.0 
Mexico 1,993 7 0.4  8 0.4  977 8 0.8  3 0.3  862 10 1.2  15 1.7 
Morocco 140 1 0.7  0 0.0  0 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0 0.0  0 0.0 
(Continued) 
 TABLE A3—Continued 
  
Worldscope  
Classification   
Global Vantage  
Classification   
Hand-Coded Classification  
plus Local GAAP Firms 
  IAS  U.S. GAAP   IAS  U.S. GAAP   IAS  U.S. GAAP 
Country n n %   n %  n n %   n %  n n %   n % 
The Netherlands 4,295 185 4.3  232 5.4  2,533 95 3.8  162 6.4  2,151 131 6.1  192 8.9 
New Zealand 1,463 31 2.1  0 0.0  756 12 1.6  25 3.3  629 6 1.0  28 4.5 
Norway 3,120 35 1.1  63 2.0  1,722 23 1.3  27 1.6  1,411 30 2.1  67 4.7 
Pakistan 1,017 16 1.6  0 0.0  454 12 2.6  0 0.0  432 68 15.7  0 0.0 
Peru 812 10 1.2  4 0.5  0 0 0.0  0 0.0  283 149 52.7  6 2.1 
Philippines 2,117 2 0.1  18 0.9  1,575 134 8.5  10 0.6  789 7 0.9  21 2.7 
Poland 880 82 9.3  5 0.6  362 59 16.3  0 0.0  243 56 23.0  5 2.1 
Portugal 1,368 33 2.4  1 0.1  551 21 3.8  0 0.0  351 36 10.3  0 0.0 
Russian Federation  387 113 29.2  81 20.9  150 60 40.0  51 34.0  220 91 41.4  57 25.9 
Singapore 5,465 147 2.7  35 0.6  4,410 17 0.4  22 0.5  3,996 139 3.5  39 1.0 
South Africa 5,936 75 1.3  4 0.1  1,740 149 8.6  5 0.3  1,452 162 11.2  4 0.3 
Spain 3,313 22 0.7  7 0.2  1,906 8 0.4  5 0.3  1,556 6 0.4  5 0.3 
Sri Lanka 256 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0 0.0  0 0.0 
Sweden 5,376 174 3.2  0 0.0  3,099 132 4.3  22 0.7  2,651 93 3.5  14 0.5 
Switzerland 4,863 1,515 31.2  130 2.7  3,113 1,294 41.6  105 3.4  3,207 1,356 42.3  117 3.6 
Taiwan 8,873 1 0.0  11 0.1  2,477 0 0.0  0 0.0  2,249 0 0.0  15 0.7 
Thailand 5,033 5 0.1  0 0.0  4,140 9 0.2  1 0.0  3,530 4 0.1  0 0.0 
Turkey 1,921 255 13.3  2 0.1  469 156 33.3  10 2.1  945 276 29.2  6 0.6 
United Kingdom 37,700 233 0.6  83 0.2  18,228 56 0.3  50 0.3  15,669 170 1.1  53 0.3 
Venezuela 454 3 0.7  17 3.7  0 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0 0.0  0 0.0 
Total 291,701 13,001 4.5  3,890 1.3  178,459 6,227 3.5  2,345 1.3  146,238 8,399 5.7  3,588 2.5 
 
The sample comprises all firm-year observations in Worldscope and Global Vantage from countries with at least 20 observations and total assets available in a given 
year. The hand-coded classification is based on 27,589 observations from firms that Worldscope or Global Vantage identify as potential IAS/IFRS or U.S. GAAP users 
and for which we were able to collect annual reports through Thomson Research. We then add all observations of firms that are uniformly classified as reporting under 
local GAAP by both Worldscope and Global Vantage to the hand-coded sample. The table reports the total number of firm-years and the number and percent of IAS or 
U.S. GAAP observations, using the three accounting standards classifications outlined in Table A1. 
 
 TABLE A4 
IAS Adoption Patterns and Identification of IAS Switch Years 





Panel A: Firms with IAS Switch Year 
In the following (stylized) cases, we can identify a switch year to IAS/IFRS reporting, 
and hence classify firms as serious or label IAS adopters for our analyses. 
   
Years: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8     
(1) Firms switching from local GAAP to IAS 
 Local Local Local Local IAS IAS IAS IAS 
696 4,483 6.5 
(2) Firms switching from local GAAP to IAS, and then back to local GAAP 
 Local Local IAS IAS IAS IAS Local Local 
87 422 0.6 
(3) Firms switching from local GAAP to IAS, back to local GAAP, and then for a 
second time to IAS 
 Local Local IAS IAS Local Local  IAS IAS 
19 71 0.1 
(4) Firms switching twice from local GAAP to IAS, and back to local GAAP 
 Local IAS IAS Local Local IAS IAS Local 
1 3 0.0 
(5) Firms switching from IAS to local GAAP, and then back to IAS 
 IAS IAS Local Local Local IAS IAS IAS 
34 206 0.3 
(6) Firms switching from IAS to local GAAP, back to IAS, and then for a second time 
to local GAAP 
 IAS IAS Local Local IAS IAS Local Local 
6 37 0.1 
(7) Firms switching from local GAAP to IAS, and then to U.S. GAAP 
 Local Local Local IAS IAS IAS U.S. U.S. 
2 6 0.0 
Panel B: Firms without IAS Switch Year 
In the following (stylized) cases, we are unable to identify a switch year to IAS/IFRS  
reporting, and hence exclude the firms from the serious versus label IAS partitions. 
  
Years: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8     
(1) Firms reporting under IAS during the entire time period 
 IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS IAS 
544 2,691 3.9 
(2) Firms switching from IAS to local GAAP 
 IAS IAS IAS IAS Local Local Local Local 
26 144 0.2 
(3) Firms switching from local GAAP to U.S. GAAP, and then to IAS 
 Local Local U.S. U.S. U.S. IAS IAS IAS 
0 0 0.0 
(4) Firms switching from U.S. GAAP to IAS 
 U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. IAS IAS IAS IAS 
0 0 0.0 
(5) Firms reporting under local GAAP during the entire time period 
 Local Local Local Local Local Local Local Local 
10,756 61,465 88.4 
(6) Other (e.g., more than two switches; switches to other foreign GAAP) – – – 
Total 12,171 69,528 100.0 
 
The table reports the number of unique firms, and the number and percentage of firm-years across various IAS adoption 
patterns for our base sample comprising 69,528 firm-year observations from 30 countries between 1990 and 2005 (see 
Table 1). We create a panel of firms’ accounting standards over time based on the “accounting standards followed” field in 
Worldscope (field 07536), and then adjusted the coding for contradictory information from an extensive review of firms’ 
annual reports. We manually check that the augmenting process does not introduce artificial IAS switch years. We require a 
switch year (denoted by IAS in Panel A) for IAS adopting firms to be included in the serious versus label analyses. For 
firms with two IAS switch years, we utilize the second switch year in our analyses because our manual review found those 
to be more reliable. In this case, we set the earlier IAS firm-year observations to missing. 
